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Abstract 
Information security (InfoSec) policies are widely used by institutions as a form of InfoSec 
control measure to protect their information assets. InfoSec policies are commonly 
documented in natural language, which is prone to ambiguity and misinterpretation, thereby 
making it hard, if not impossible, for users to comply with. These misinterpretations may lead 
the students or staff members to wrongfully execute the required actions, thereby making 
institutions vulnerable to InfoSec attacks. According to the literature review conducted in this 
work, InfoSec policy documents are often not followed or complied with; and the key issues 
facing InfoSec policy compliance include the lack of management support for InfoSec, 
organisational cultures of non-compliance, intentional and unintentional policy violation by 
employees (the insider threat), lack of policy awareness and training as well as the policy 
being unclear or ambiguous. This study is set in the higher education context and explores 
the extent to which the non-compliance problem is embedded within the policy documents 
themselves being affected by ambiguity.  
 
A qualitative method with a case study research strategy was followed in the research, in 
the form of an inductive approach with a cross-sectional time horizon, whereby a selection 
case of relevant institutional InfoSec policies were analysed. The data was collected in the 
form of academic literature and InfoSec policies of higher education institutions to derive 
themes for data analysis. A qualitative content analysis was performed on the policies, which 
identified ambiguity problems in the data. The findings indicated the presence of ambiguity 
within the policy documents, making it possible to misinterpret some of the policy 
statements. Formal methods were explored as a possible solution to the policy ambiguity. A 
framework was then proposed to address ambiguity and improve on the clarity of the 
semantics of policy statements. The framework can be used by policy writers in paying 
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attention to the presence of ambiguity in their policies and address these when drafting or 
revising their policy documents.  
Keywords- Formal methods, Policy ambiguity; Usable security; Policy clarity; Policy human 
aspects; Security policy compliance  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to the study 
1.1. Introduction 
This is a dissertation on information security (InfoSec) policies and the challenges 
associated with the policy usage. Most higher learning institutions have adopted the use of 
mobile and electronic devices for teaching and learning (Defta, 2011). The use of electronic 
devices for educational purposes is referred to as electronic learning (e-learning) (Dabbagh 
& Kitsantas, 2012).  While adopting the e-learning pedagogy, the institutions of higher 
learning also have had to take into consideration the need for InfoSec measures to protect 
the institutional data on the electronic platforms (Buthelezi & Mujinga, 2013). The 
institutional data could be in the form of student assignments submitted, student grades or 
it could be student and staff personal details.  
 
The protection of institutional data for e-learning purposes has persuaded the researcher to 
investigate the InfoSec policies of higher education institutions, their contents and the 
challenges that face the policy usage.  The next section provides the general background 
on information security. 
 
1.2. Information security background 
Security is the concept of feeling secure or safe from harm and danger (Whitman & Mattord, 
2012). InfoSec is a concept centred on protecting the organisation’s information and human 
resources by way of monitoring and compliance assessments (Gelbstein, 2006). 
Furthermore, InfoSec focuses on preserving the critical characteristics of information, such 
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as availability, accuracy, authenticity, confidentiality and integrity (Whitman & Mattord, 
2012). Given the growing importance of information, it is often viewed as being analogous 
to an organisation’s key resource (Doherty, Anastasakis & Fulford, 2009). In the information 
and technology era where online presence and social media presence are important, 
information is indeed a key resource in any organisation. According to Peppard (2007), 
many executive teams have acknowledged the importance of information and that it ought 
to be managed efficiently.  
 
Based on the importance placed on organisational information, it has become essential to 
put measures in place to safeguard such information. It becomes evident why there is a 
great need for information to be secured and effectively so, as access to organisational 
information has to be tightly controlled. Knapp, Morris, Marshall & Byrd, (2009) agree that 
organisations are more dependent on the reliability of their information systems in order to 
ensure the credibility of their information and decisions. This information includes trade 
secrets, patented ideas, patterns and recipes. What, for instance, would happen to the Coca 
cola beverage company, if consumers knew how to recreate their soft drinks in their own 
homes? This is the type of damage that could befall an organisation if its information is not 
effectively protected. Therefore, there is a need for InfoSec measures.  
 
The InfoSec measures include defining the rules to govern the way in which organisational 
information should be secured or protected; such governing rules are the contents of InfoSec 
policies (Doherty, Anastasakis & Fulford, 2009). InfoSec policies are used as controls in the 
risk-management field of information technology (IT). Höne & Eloff (2002) further reiterated 
that InfoSec policies act as controls to manage InfoSec in an organisation. The state of 
InfoSec in an organisation is often measured against the InfoSec policy as an organisational 
benchmark. The organisation has to ensure that the InfoSec policy is available to its intended 
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users, reasonably easy to use, regularly updated and kept current (Gelbstein, 2006). InfoSec 
policies allow for the tracing and preserving of the information characteristics that could be 
compromised if or when the information is accessed and tampered with. 
 
There is currently widespread use of information and communications technology (ICT) such 
as mobile phones, laptops and tablet devices. These ICT devices can be used for a variety 
of activities, from accessing study material to online shopping and social networking with the 
aid of an internet connection. When using the ICT devices on the internet (online), users 
often share and exchange personal information with others (Gelbstein, 2006).  
 
The online information exchange could be intercepted and used for unauthorised purposes 
by malicious users (Knapp, Morris, Marshall & Byrd, 2009). Therefore, there is a need for 
policies to guide the technology users on how to protect their personal information as well 
as institutional information from unauthorised access. Corporate organisations have these 
guidelines written in their information security (InfoSec) policy document, and so do Higher 
learning institutions (Peppard, 2007).  
 
Although it remains the responsibility of the users to protect their personal information when 
using technology, the organisations provide the policy as a security control to guide the 
users on the organisational ICT infrastructure and what the organisation deems acceptable 
use of the information assets (Whitman & Mattord, 2012).  
 
The InfoSec policy document should be made available to all employees who will be granted 
access to organisational information resources (system users). The system users are to 
read and acknowledge that they have read, accepted and understood the contents of the 
InfoSec policy (Whitman & Mattord, 2012).  
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The InfoSec policy document also states the user roles and responsibilities in protecting the 
organisational information. On the other hand, the user privileges would be the type of 
access that the user has been granted, on each system available to them. The privileges 
are documented in the system security policies in the form of configurations and settings 
(Knapp, Morris, Marshall & Byrd, 2009). The next section discusses the InfoSec policy 
document in detail. 
 
1.2.1. The information security policy document 
The InfoSec policy document is a security control that is used to preserve the confidentiality, 
integrity and authenticity of information (Whitman & Mattord, 2012). The confidentiality can 
be preserved by ensuring only authorised users have access to the information (Gelbstein, 
2006).  The integrity can be preserved by ensuring that only the authorised users can make 
changes to the information; and the authenticity can be maintained by making sure that the 
system users are indeed who they claim to be.  
 
To ensure authenticity, users are typically authenticated with the use of a username and 
password credentials before they can access the information system (Peppard, 2007; 
Andress, 2014). Once a user has been authenticated with a username and password (user 
profile), any subsequent actions performed by that user profile on any information system, 
would be referred to as the actions performed by that particular user (Whitman & Mattord, 
2012). This means that all the system users will be held responsible for any actions 
performed using their user profile. 
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In the case where system users have shared or disclosed their password to someone else, 
it means that the other person could gain access to the system pretending to be the 
authorised user. For this reason, the InfoSec policy would generally have a password 
management section where it provides the minimum requirements for a safe password also 
state that users should not share or disclose their passwords to anyone. The next section 
discusses InfoSec policy compliance. 
 
1.2.2. Information security policy compliance 
InfoSec policies define the rules that govern access to information and other resources 
belonging to an organisation. The defined rules detail the intended information resource 
users and their access rights and responsibilities. These policies are aimed at helping users 
understand what is deemed acceptable and responsible behaviour in handling 
organisational data and information to ensure the safe and secure handling of information 
in performing their organisational duties and responsibility (Höne & Eloff, 2002). There have 
been developments on what a good InfoSec policy should entail. One of the most recent 
ones is by Whitman & Mattord (2012). They describe the notion of a good InfoSec policy as 
one that encapsulates the responsibilities of individuals, indicates what is authorised and 
unauthorised system use and enables individuals to report suspected or identified threats 
(whistle blowing). Furthermore, it should define punishment means for policy violations and 
ways to update the policy to keep up with the constantly changing IT environment. 
 
Employees should have no excuse for not being able to apply defined security practices in 
accordance with the established InfoSec policy (Saleh, Alrabiah & Saad, 2007). Hence there 
should be established InfoSec policies in place for employees to apply and adhere to. 
Subsequently, the InfoSec policy should act as the point of departure for employees to follow 
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regarding all InfoSec issues, and in so doing; it becomes the ‘heart and basis’ of successful 
security management (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004:374). With the InfoSec policy being 
referred to as the heart and basis of successful security management, it can be concluded 
that this document should be written in a manner that is comprehensible to all employees, 
similar to how the organisational values are documented, in simple, user-centred language. 
 
1.2.3. Inconsistencies and information security policies 
One of the main issues surrounding InfoSec policy compliance is that the InfoSec policies 
are generally documented in natural language, which is prone to ambiguity and 
inconsistencies (Andress, 2014). Kamsties & Paech (2000) postulate that although natural 
language is generally considered flexible, universal and wide-spread, documents that are in 
natural language are known to be inconsistent, incomplete and integrally ambiguous. 
 
In order to understand the reported inconsistency problem within InfoSec policy documents, 
a sample of online InfoSec policy documents from institutions of higher learning were 
collected and reviewed. Among the collected documents was an, “Information security best 
practice document” (Information security best practice document, 2010). 
 
While reviewing the Information security best practice document by (Information security 
best practice document, 2010:13), which should be a guiding document for InfoSec policies, 
the following inconsistencies were noted: The document stated in its classification and 
control of assets section that  
“[a] plan for electronic storage of essential documentation should be developed”. 
(Information security best practice document, 2010:13) 
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There was neither an indication of who (what role) should develop this plan, nor did it define 
or refer to a definition of what ‘essential documentation’ referred to. This made it open-ended 
and susceptible to misinterpretation. However, in the section on protection against malicious 
code, the same document stated that  
“[c]omputer equipment must be safeguarded against virus and other malicious code. 
This is the responsibility of the IT security manager”. (Information security best 
practice document, 2010:13) 
In this section, the responsibility was clearly allocated and documented. There was a level 
of assumed, implicit knowledge in the first requirement and the latter requirement was 
explicitly stated in clear terms (Hostland, Enstad, Eilertsen & Boe, 2010).  The above 
discussion leads to the following problem statement. 
1.3. Problem statement   
InfoSec policies could suffer from reduced clarity due to the policy documents not being 
coherent. Policy users tend to unintentionally breach the InfoSec policy because of 
misinterpreting the policy statements. The researcher departed from the premise that the 
InfoSec policies are prone to the lack of clarity. These policies are often documented in 
natural language, which renders some of the content ambiguous and subject to different 
interpretations. Andress (2014) reported an important aspect of InfoSec policies, namely 
that they should be kept current by means of periodic reviews and updates to ensure that 
they are relevant and applied by their intended users. Updates are often made when 
inconsistencies or conflicts are noted in the policy documents or to address new aspects 
that have been introduced by the constantly changing technology environment. 
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Doherty, Anastasakis & Fulford (2009) suggest that the most important role of the InfoSec 
policy is to make plain the rights and responsibilities of users such that these are made clear 
to and are understood by the users. This is to ensure that there is a uniform and consistent 
institutional view of InfoSec. This further points to the need to make InfoSec policies explicit, 
leading to the need to formalise them. Rees, Bandyopadhyay & Spafford (2003) arrived at 
a similar conclusion, pointing out the problem of keeping InfoSec policies consistent.  
 
Generally, InfoSec policies are often documented in ambiguity-prone natural language 
(Parkin, Van Moorsel & Coles, 2009). The presence of ambiguity could lead to reduced 
clarity, which could lead the InfoSec policy users to incorrectly execute policy statements, 
thereby making it difficult to comply with the unclear policies. 
 
There have been empirical contributions and academic discussions focussing on the content 
of InfoSec policies with reference to the topics addressed by the policy documents, but not 
on the clarity and consistency of the policy content detail, as observed from Olnes (1994), 
Pounder (2002) as well as Doherty, Anastasakis & Fulford (2009). 
 
The next section provides the research aim and objectives compiled to address the research 
problem. 
 
1.4. Research Aim and Objectives 
1.4.1. Research Aim 
The aim of the research is to conceptualise a framework for addressing university InfoSec 
policy ambiguity, to aid InfoSec policy compliance.  
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The research aim was broken down into achievable action items in the form of research 
objectives in the next section. 
 
1.4.2. Research Objectives 
In order to fulfil the research aim, the following research objectives (ROs) were derived: 
RO1: Explore the literature on InfoSec policies; 
RO2: Identify the main problems facing InfoSec policy compliance; 
RO3: Identify the main problems relating to ambiguity within InfoSec policies; 
RO4: Compile a framework on how InfoSec policy ambiguity can be reduced to improve 
compliance and clarity. 
 
The next section provides the research questions used to address the research objectives. 
 
1.5. Research questions  
1.5.1. Main research question 
To define and fulfil the objectives of this research, the following primary research question 
(PRQ) was formulated for the study: 
PRQ: How can a framework for addressing university InfoSec policy ambiguity be 
conceptualised? 
The next section provides the secondary research questions that were posed, in order to 
answer the PRQ in detail. 
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1.5.2. Secondary research questions 
From the main research question, the following secondary research questions (SRQs) were 
derived: 
SRQ1: What does literature on InfoSec policies say about InfoSec policy issues? 
SRQ 2: What are the main problems with InfoSec policy compliance? 
SRQ 3: What are the main problems relating to ambiguity within InfoSec policies? 
SRQ 4: How can InfoSec policy ambiguities be reduced to improve policy compliance and 
clarity? 
 
1.6. Study Location and Context 
The study is located in the sub-Saharan country of South Africa, in the context of higher 
learning institutions.  
 
One of the country’s biggest e-learning and open-distance learning (ODL) institutions was 
used for the research. The reason for the context was that as an ODL institution, most of its 
students studied online and needed to rely on the institution’s e-learning systems. The same 
reliance goes for the staff members for academic and administrative purposes.  
 
The student and staff reliance of the e-learning systems therefore requires for them to 
familiarise themselves with the institutional InfoSec policies for guidance on using the e-
learning system securely, and minimise security incidents. This research departs from the 
perspective of the staff members in the context of a higher education institution.  
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1.7. Significance of the study 
InfoSec policies are the documents that help govern organisations’ InfoSec. These are often 
ambiguous, as they are stated and documented in natural language, which is open to 
misinterpretation. Consequently, these policies could be bypassed by the intended users or 
misinterpreted, because the users could act based on the incorrect interpretation of the 
policy requirements. Users could therefore use other possible meanings of the policy 
requirement and not the interpretation that was intended by the policy owners, which may 
lead to a breach of policy. This could lead to the policy users exposing the institution to IT 
risks, thereby rendering it susceptible to InfoSec exploitation and possible attacks.  
 
The researcher reviewed the contents of InfoSec policies for the existence of ambiguities 
and suggested a framework to reduce ambiguity in such policy statements. This research 
should make a contribution such that future InfoSec policies may be made clearer and 
therefore more comprehensible and easy to use. The practical contribution of this research 
would be a new framework for clarifying InfoSec policy documents, such that only one 
interpretation is understood from each policy statement with no alternative translations. This 
devised framework should facilitate policy and decision making in the InfoSec space and 
inform practice.  
 
Oates (2009) echoes the view that research should be significant such that it brings about 
new theories or informs practice. The recommendations from this research could be used 
by InfoSec professionals in devising or enhancing their InfoSec policies. The theoretical 
contribution will be the compilation of a framework for reducing ambiguity within InfoSec 
policies, resulting in more comprehensible and precise policy requirements and thereby 
improved compliance with the InfoSec policies. 
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1.8. Research Methodology 
This research used an interpretive philosophical paradigm and a qualitative research 
method with a case study research strategy was followed for this research in the form of an 
inductive approach with a short-term, contemporary time focus, also referred to as a cross-
sectional time horizon as noted in Figure 1.1.  
 
Positivism
                                        Interpretivism
Realism
Inductive
Deductive
         
            
Research philosophy
      
 Qualitative
  
                       Quantitative
                
       
Experiment
Survey
                 
Case study
                            Archival study
       Ethnography
           Grounded theory
    
   
        
            Cross-sectional
     Longitudinal
Surveys
Literature analysis
Documents
Questionnaires
Interviews
Observations
Data collection and 
analysis
techniques/ procedures Time horizons Research  strategies Research approachesResearch methods
 
Figure 1.1: The research onion adapted from (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009) 
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Figure 1.1 represents the research onion by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, (2009), which is 
commonly used to represent the research process. For this research project, the research 
process was as follows:  
 
The aim of the research is to conceptualise a framework for addressing university InfoSec 
policy ambiguity, to aid InfoSec policy compliance.  To achieve this, the researcher first had 
to investigate the existence of ambiguities within InfoSec policies and to explore how these 
occur and how the ambiguities pose a compliance problem.  
 
The researcher conducted a systematic literature review and also collected institutional 
InfoSec policies online for an initial review, in order to identify the occurring themes.  Part of 
the process in identifying the themes included analysing the policy statements for ambiguity, 
and determined whether different interpretations could be made from the policy requirement. 
Each identified type of ambiguity constituted a theme.  
 
The identified themes were later used in reviewing the policy document samples from the 
sampled South African Higher Education institution.  A framework of possible solutions to 
reduce ambiguity was drafted and documented in Chapter 5.  
 
Using a literature review as well as content analysis is a form of triangulation that was used 
to ensure reliability of the findings.  
 
The research data was collected in the form of a literature analysis of academic literature, 
as well as online existing InfoSec policy documents. A systematic literature search was first 
performed to gather background literature on the work performed in the area of InfoSec 
policy compliance and to identify a research gap that this research project could address (cf. 
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Stemler, 2001; Yin, 2009). This was followed by a qualitative content analysis to identify 
ambiguity problems as themes in the data (cf. Palinkas, Horwitz, Green, Wisdom, Duan & 
Hoagwood, 2015).  
 
The content analysis centres its data collection on existing data sets or archival documents 
(Elo et al., 2015; Polit & Beck, 2012). When the data had been analysed and the ambiguity 
problem was evident, the researcher sought possible solutions to the identified ambiguity 
problems in the form of a set of steps to be followed per problem type. This process of 
seeking possible solutions resulted in a model built to address each identified ambiguity 
problem type. 
 
The research methodology and research onion were discussed in detail in the research 
methodology chapter, chapter 3. The next section discusses the research limitations and 
delineations. 
 
1.9. Limitations and delineations 
The researcher anticipated that the institutional InfoSec IS policies would have some level 
of ambiguity and expected to improve the quality and comprehensibility of the said InfoSec 
IS Policies by devising a way to reduce the ambiguity. The researcher has noted that the 
current documentation of InfoSec policies is in the natural languages, which is susceptible 
to multiple interpretations.  
 
This has led the researcher to further explore the details of these InfoSec policies and verify 
the existence of ambiguities. Subsequent to determining the existence of the ambiguities, a 
framework was developed for addressing the identified ambiguities. The ambiguities 
included identifying omissions and contradictions in the InfoSec policy documents. The 
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presence of ambiguity could lead to reduced clarity, which could lead the InfoSec policy 
users to incorrectly execute policy statements, and thereby fore making it difficult to comply 
with the unclear policies.  One of the limitations of the study is that the study was conducted 
by a single researcher due to the study being a dissertation. 
 
The scope of this research is limited to user InfoSec policies and does not extend to the 
inclusion of system InfoSec policies. The next section presents the proposed contribution of 
the study. 
1.10. Proposed contribution  
The results of the study should inform practice in the field of InfoSec management, mainly 
the InfoSec manager in the process of developing, reviewing, updating and managing the 
InfoSec policy document. Managers can use this study as a reference point to begin the 
review of their policies for ambiguities, and to address any existing ambiguities towards 
clearer and more enforceable policy documents. The next section provides the dissertation 
structure. 
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1.11. Dissertation structure  
The structure of the dissertation is outlined in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2: The dissertation structure  
 
Chapter 1 provides the introduction and background of the study, the research problem, 
questions, objectives, limitations and the significance of the study.  
Chapter 2 presents the literature review on InfoSec policies, ambiguity and the higher 
education context.  
Chapter 3 provides the research methodology used for this research project, including the 
research strategy, design and data-collection and analysis techniques.  
Chapter 4 discusses the research results from the data analysis and the interpretation of 
the findings.  
Appendices  
References
Chapter 6: Conclusion and recommendations
Chapter 5: Proposed solution and framework
Chapter 4: Data analysis and findings
Chapter 3: Research design and methodology
Chapter 2: Literature review
Chapter 1: Introduction to the study
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Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the proposed framework for addressing the InfoSec 
policy ambiguity problem.  
Chapter 6, the last chapter, provides the conclusion and recommendations.  
The study concludes with a number of appendices. 
 
1.12. Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the research background, problem statement, aims and objectives. 
It highlighted the significance of the study and defined the research questions as well as the 
assumptions and limitations.  
 
The study focus area was introduced, the details of the problem were stated, and 
significance of the study presented to justify the need for this research to be conducted.  The 
research methodology was noted to guide the reader on the path that the researcher took 
on the research journey.  
 
The next chapter presents the literature review conducted to develop a perspective on the 
current state of InfoSec, ambiguity, the higher education context and InfoSec policy research 
areas to inform the research process undertaken.  
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Chapter 2 
 Literature review 
2.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter provided the introduction and background to the study, as well as an 
overview of the chapters that follow. The research problem and objectives were also 
presented in the chapter 1. This chapter presents the literature review of the reviewed 
academic literature relevant to the research objectives and questions of the study. The 
following research objectives have been addressed in this chapter: 
RO1: Explore the literature on InfoSec policies; 
RO2: Identify the main problems facing InfoSec policy compliance; 
RO3: Identify the main problems relating to ambiguity within InfoSec policies; 
The following section explores and presents the academic literature on InfoSec policies. 
 
2.2. Information security policies 
The InfoSec policy is often presented to system users at employment induction training or 
when they are issued with access to institutional information resources. For instance, a 
system user may be presented with the InfoSec policy when the ICT department issues him 
or her with a workstation or laptop computer. The system user needs to have accepted the 
InfoSec policy before institutional information system access can be granted. 
 
Similarly, for students, the InfoSec policy could be presented to the student at registration 
for their studies. The student would have to accept the InfoSec policy before they could 
continue and complete the registration process for their studies. Subsequently, some system 
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users sign the InfoSec policy only as a formality in order to receive access to and use the 
institutional ICT resources, and not because they necessarily understood said policy 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2012). 
 
User InfoSec policies are those that are read and applied by ICT system users in the form 
of written documents, while system policies are those applied in the ICT systems in the form 
of system configurations. The user InfoSec policy is hereafter referred to simply as the 
InfoSec policy. The InfoSec policy document is used as a security control measure to 
preserve the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of institutional and user information by 
outlining what the institution deems acceptable use of its ICT resources (Whitman & Mattord, 
2012).   
 
The effectiveness of information system’s security can be achieved through promoting 
adequate InfoSec behaviour and constraining unacceptable information behaviour among 
employees in the organisation (Woodhouse, 2007). Lindup (1995) presents four types of 
security policies: the system security policy, the product security policy, the community 
security policy and the corporate InfoSec policy.  
 
This research focused on corporate InfoSec policies in the higher education institutional 
context. These are generally specified and documented in natural language. Do Amaral, 
Bazilio, Da Silva, Rademaker & Haeusler (2006), state that an InfoSec policy defines the 
actions to be taken in order to achieve the security control objectives for the organisations’ 
desired level of security.  
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2.3. The information security policy and higher education  
The higher education space has taken considerable interest in using ICT for teaching and 
learning. A pedagogical shift has taken place where teaching and learning activities have 
moved from classroom-based to online platforms. Online platforms are referred to as online 
learning tools, electronic learning (e-learning) platforms and online courseware. There are 
even free platforms called mobile open online courseware. Technology use has evolved 
from pen and paper, chalkboard, transparency projectors, overhead projectors and 
interactive white boards to e-learning based on electronic tools for teaching and learning 
(Adibi, 2010; Carter, 1996).  
 
The growing need for online learning requires of higher education institutions to use 
technology and media in the delivery of learning content. Learning is a social process that 
requires on-demand and online delivery of study content (Harasim, 2002; Swan & Shea, 
2005). It was this major ICT adoption by higher education institutions that led the researcher 
to undertake this study: With the vast technology use for day-to-day teaching and learning 
came the challenge of securing tuition content online. Tuition content includes student and 
staff personal information, financial information and student grades (Buthelezi & Mujinga, 
2013). 
 
The sensitive nature of tuition content, demands that there should be documented rules and 
guidelines to govern how this content is accessed, used and stored for secure institutional 
use of technology (Doherty, Anastasakis & Fulford, 2009; Knapp, Morris, Marshall & Byrd, 
2009). Even within the academic space, InfoSec policies and guidelines have been 
established to accomplish this governance aspect (Soomro, Shah & Ahmed, 2016). InfoSec 
policies are often documented in ambiguity-prone natural language (Parkin, Van Moorsel & 
Coles, 2009). The presence of ambiguity could lead to reduced clarity, which could lead 
   
  
 
 
 
 
M.P. Buthelezi: 47361921  
  
 
 
 
21 
InfoSec policy users to incorrectly executing policy statements, thereby making it difficult to 
comply with the unclear policies.   
 
The move to an online pedagogy of teaching and learning has also raised user expectations 
for just-in-time (available around the clock) and just-in-context (students choosing only what 
interests them) learning, where students want access to the learning materials as and when 
they need to. According to the findings of prior research, as documented by Lan and Sie 
(2010), the use of mobile devices to support learning activities has been reported to be 
beneficial because it encourages learner-to-learner interaction, the same interaction which 
was reported by Moore and Kearsley (2005) to be motivating and stimulating for learners. 
This view is supported by Richardson and Swan (2003), who assert that this interaction is 
critical in learning.   
 
Education has been viewed as a social practice, and learners often use mobile devices for 
social networking per social learning theory, it follows that mobile devices should be capable 
of being used as learning tools to support online learning. Social learning theory further 
perceives learning to take place during social interactions in a community with similar 
interests (Wenger, 2000). Therefore, by virtue of social networks and discussion forums 
being social environments, learning should take place on this platform as well. 
 
2.3.1. Human infrastructure 
The shift from traditional teaching and learning to ODL brings about a number of challenges 
for both the student and the institution. At the forefront is the need to train instructors and 
prepare them for the new way of teaching and learning. That way, they will be better 
equipped to utilise the infrastructure and assist students in ODL. Hutchins (2003) found that 
an instructor’s behaviour determines the success of the online learning model, as there are 
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significant differences between the behaviour of online instructors and classroom 
instructors. This suggests that instructors need to be prepared for online learning delivery, 
mostly through training in ways of interacting with students through online tools. 
 
2.3.2.  Information and communications technology 
infrastructure 
Technological infrastructure refers to all the aspects of ICT facilities that need to be in place 
for the introduction of ICT in the classroom; this includes ICT devices and networks. Schools 
need to have proper facilities such as computers with a functional operating system and 
connected to the internet through faster and usable bandwidth speeds that allow 
communication with reasonable speeds. The virtual learning environment, also known as 
the e-learning platform or learning management system, is a set of learning and teaching 
tools such as discussions, electronic documents and learning units usually provided through 
a web portal (Van Raaij & Schepers, 2008).  
 
E-learning platforms are becoming an integral part of the teaching and learning process 
(Pituch & Lee, 2006), but the main problem in developing countries is the high cost and 
limited bandwidth. Schools are affected most because they have limited financial resources. 
At the core of online learning is the internet, as it is the delivery medium of online content 
(Zhang & Nunamaker, 2003). Most of the online content delivery services such as video and 
audio streaming or playback require high-speed internet compared to browsing (Liu, Guo & 
Liang, 2008; Wu, Hou, Zhu, Zhang & Peha, 2001). Internet coverage and e-learning 
implementation in developing economies, especially in Africa, still prove to be a challenge 
due to lack of infrastructure, particularly broadband (Twinomugisha, 2010).  
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2.4. Information and communications technology in higher 
education 
Institutions of higher learning provide teaching and learning as the core service to their 
clients, the students. As discussed, the nature of teaching and learning has since evolved 
to be a more digitised pedagogy. Higher education institutions have embraced the use of 
ICT to deliver teaching and learning content to the distantly located student. This trend has 
seen a proliferation of online learning platform production. This includes off-the-shelf 
products and some tailor-made products for specific institutions’ needs.  
 
Even though teaching and learning have transferred to the online spectrum, its accessibility 
for the majority of students in developing countries is still a major challenge due to the 
countries’ legacy of internet connectivity problems. Those in rural areas are further 
constrained by the lack of infrastructure, which introduces a severe obstacle to full adoption 
of the model by institutions as they are forced to provide alternative modes of teaching and 
learning to those students still struggling to come on-board the digital highway. In some 
cases, open and distance learning (ODL) institutions are compelled to provide internet 
connectivity to students through initiatives such as subsidising bandwidth costs and 
partnerships with internet service providers and internet café operators.  
 
As a result, ODL institutions end up running two parallel models of content delivery: online 
and print delivery models. This results in a lack of optimisation and the benefits of online 
delivery not being fully realised. In the case of situations where e-learning adoption has been 
embraced to a larger extent, the problem is that of conducting summative assessment. 
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2.4.1. Electronic learning 
E-learning is the use of IT tools for learning purposes (Dabbagh & Kitsantas, 2012). E-
learning uses electronic channels for communication and delivery of the teaching and 
learning content to students. E-learning started as the use of electronic devices such as 
CDs, DVDs and tapes, which were sent to students and the content opened through a 
computer, but has now extended to the online mode of delivery (Adibi, 2010).  
 
A typical online learning platform provides tools such as discussion forums, video and audio 
podcasts and electronic documents. It usually involves two-way communication between 
students and the institution. According to Smeureanu & Isaila (2008), e-learning qualifies as 
a type of distance learning, as the educator and the student are often in different locations 
with asynchronous means of interacting. Craciunas & Elsek (2009) as well as Soomro, 
Shah, & Ahmed (2016) present the characteristics of e-learning systems as follows: 
Learning takes place in a virtual class that is coordinated by a facilitator, the content is made 
available over the internet, learning is a social process, there is activity monitoring of the 
participants and the environment allows the transfer of knowledge and skills.  
 
Online learning brings about a number of benefits to both the student and the institution. E-
learning has shifted the learning process from teacher-focused to learner-centred learning. 
Previous studies identified the benefit of flexibility to students, as it allows them to collaborate 
online without the need to rearrange their schedule (Petrides, 2002; Schrum, 2002; 
Vonderwell, 2003), especially for those students studying part-time and working full-time. 
Such flexibility is not available in residential institutions. The convenience of choosing the 
most suitable time to engage with online learning tools is another strength reported by 
students (Ke & Kwak, 2012). 
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2.5. Why e-learning requires security 
The higher education space has taken much interest in technology as a teaching tool. There 
has been a drive to be innovative in delivering tuition. With the vast technology use come 
InfoSec risks and the need to document InfoSec policies and guidelines for secure 
technology use.  There is a great need for securing e-learning systems to ensure that they 
are not compromised. Securing these systems is also required to gain user confidence in 
the validity of the online qualification offered.  
 
To secure the e-assessment system, the following, per Marais (2006), have to be 
addressed: authenticity of the candidate has to be guaranteed, the e-assessment 
environment has to be monitored, the e-assessment integrity has to be upheld in order to 
deter electronic corruption, software glitches have to be avoided by performing periodic 
system maintenance and user privacy and confidentiality have to be ensured in order to gain 
user confidence in the system. Ensuring the security of an e-learning system is no easy task, 
and requires the protection of the content, services and personal data for external and 
internal users, including system administrators, as advocated by Defta (2011). 
 
In the e-learning pedagogy, the tuition content is delivered using the internet, intranet or 
extranet as a medium (Soomro, Shah, & Ahmed, 2016). The following security concerns 
affect e-learning by virtue of using the internet as a medium: confidentiality, integrity, 
availability of information, authorisation, authentication and non-repudiation (Defta, 2011; 
Graf, 2002). The security concerns coincide with the main pillars of InfoSec, which are 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. Other InfoSec concepts that are to be 
considered are authorisation, authentication and non-repudiation.  
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The above principles need to be addressed for the design and implementation of a secure 
and usable e-learning and assessment system. The security of e-learning platforms has to 
be considered at system implementation to build controls into it, as well as at the user 
training phase, to include user e-learning security awareness training. The security 
awareness training content should be made available to all users of the e-learning system 
when the system is introduced to them. This can be in the form of computer-based training 
or self-help documents.   
 
When the users become aware of the security features on the e-learning system, it could 
improve their confidence in the system and their willingness to accept and use it. Putting 
security measures in place for an e-learning system is referred to as e-learning security, 
which is essential to establish e-learning as a trusted tuition medium (Defta, 2011). The 
security concerns identified to be relevant to this research are the accountability, 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation and authenticity of e-learning, as 
follows:  
 
Accountability: Accountability is essential to maintain a good working relationship between 
the e-learning institution and its students. Both the student and the institution (including 
employees) have to be held accountable for their conduct on the e-learning platforms. This 
means that the actions performed in one’s profile will be directly associated with the user 
and therefore this would be expected to encourage users to protect their profiles and act 
with integrity. Consequently, the accountability factor would entail placing the security 
responsibility in the hands of the users and empowering them to secure the e-learning 
system. Acceptable use policies should be presented to the users at first use to ensure 
compliance with what is acceptable behaviour when using the e-learning system. 
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Confidentiality: E-learning material needs to be made available only to authorised users and 
the system should provide un-spoofable security mechanisms. Confidentiality protects 
against unauthorised access and distribution of an institution’s learning material, as this 
needs to be made available to enrolled students. Confidentiality is particularly important for 
e-assessment, as timing of the assessment release is of vital importance and only 
authorised students should have access to the e-assessment for a specified period of time. 
Confidentiality also ensures that user data are kept confidential and are not available to 
unauthorised users; such data include personal information and assessment results. 
 
Integrity: Integrity addresses the need for the information not to be modified by unauthorised 
users, ensuring that information integrity is preserved. Only authorised users of the e-
learning system should be allowed to modify or delete the learning material. The system 
should allocate appropriate rights to students and online facilitators. Modification of e-
learning material should be performed by legitimate and authorised system users. Such 
information includes learning material and assessment results. The integrity concern is also 
considered from the perspective of conducting summative assessments, where students are 
assessed remotely and with no proper mechanisms to identify the assessment candidate. 
 
Availability: One of the main drawcards of the e-learning model is its availability twenty-four 
seven. The availability of an e-learning web portal is important and the system should be 
protected from availability security threats such as denial of service and distributed denial of 
service. The University of South Africa (Unisa) has students from all over the globe and to 
accommodate different time zones, the system should allow students to log onto the system 
24 hours a day.  
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ODL students often partake in study and work at the same time, hence continuous system 
availability facilitates easier learning and allows students a flexible study and work schedule. 
The availability aspect extends to system availability when the students need to access it. 
There are chances that the system could become overloaded during peak usage times. The 
system could also be unavailable during its maintenance and update periods. Therefore, 
prior communication of scheduled system interruptions is sent to the students so that they 
are aware and can prepare for system downtime. 
 
Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation ensures that system users do not refute actions they 
performed on the system. An e-learning system should provide integrity of the source of 
actions and ensure that messages or actions are not modified in transit. This is usually 
achieved through mechanisms such as digital signatures using public key infrastructure. 
 
Authenticity: Authenticity specifically pertains to ensuring the identities of the parties 
involved in a communication, thereby avoiding man-in-the-middle and identity theft attacks. 
In e-learning, this usually involves a user and the e-learning server, so as to avoid leakage 
of confidential information to the wrong parties. This is of particular importance to e-
assessments, where the identity of a remote user is an integral part of the whole model 
(Rowe, 2004).  
 
Violation of authenticity brings into question the quality of a qualification being offered online, 
and ultimately the reputation of the institution is affected. This problem has resulted in a 
number of studies attempting to find a solution to positively identifying the assessment 
candidate when assessment is conducted in an unsupervised environment (Apampa, 2008; 
Furnell, 1998; Graf, 2002; Marais, 2006; Rowe, 2004). For instance, Church and Oliver 
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(2011) propose a safe and secure solution for remote supervision of a video-based 
examination with easily available hardware and software tools. 
 
Privacy: Privacy is concerned with the collected information being used only for its intended 
purpose. In the context of e-learning, privacy ensures a student’s ability to maintain a 
‘personal space’ within which the student can control the conditions under which personal 
information is shared with others (El-Khatib, Korba & Xu, 2003). This information includes 
students’ personal information and contact details, as well as collected identification 
information such as personal information, login details and biometric information (Apampa, 
Wills & Argles, 2010). Violations include using contact information for non-academic 
purposes. Usually the importance of privacy is recognised only after it has been breached. 
 
2.6. Barriers to information security policy compliance 
InfoSec policy compliance is a well-researched area and InfoSec policy non-compliance has 
been attributed to the following reasons as barriers to compliance, as depicted in Figure 2.1: 
 Lack of management support for information security:  
Prior research cites management support as one of the most important components of 
effective InfoSec management (Doherty, Anastasakis & Fulford, 2009; Padayachee, 2012; 
Whitman & Mattord, 2012). Hu, Dinev, Hart & Cooke (2012) found that the participation and 
commitment of top management in terms of InfoSec management had a significant impact 
on employee attitudes towards InfoSec policy compliance. 
 
 Organisational culture:  
Organisational culture can affect user compliance with the InfoSec policy, based on what is 
deemed as acceptable behaviour among fellow employees. Siponen & Vance (2010) refer 
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to this phenomenon as an ‘appeal to higher loyalties’. A security-aware culture would 
encourage InfoSec policy compliance (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010). Organisations should 
cultivate an InfoSec-receptive culture (Thomson, Von Solms & Louw, 2006).  
 
 Information security policy awareness and training:  
Some policy users have been reported to have perceived the InfoSec policy to be a nuisance 
by restricting their freedom to use the systems (Dagada & Eloff, 2013). Educating users on 
their InfoSec roles leads to increased policy awareness, which has been advocated to 
increase compliance (Siponen, Mahmood & Pahnila, 2014). 
 
 Human aspects of information security:  
It has often been said that the weakness of any security system are the people using the 
policies (Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, Pattinson & Jerram, 2014). Much of prior research 
has focused on measuring compliance levels and evaluating the human aspects of 
compliance. These human aspects of compliance have been extensively evaluated based 
on theories from the field of psychology and criminology, such as the theory of planned 
behaviour, deterrence theory as well as protection motivation theory (Ifinedo, 2012).  
 
 Information security policy clarity:  
The words ‘lack of policy clarity’ have often been used to refer to ambiguity in policies. The 
InfoSec policies have been reported to be too long and ambiguous. The existence of 
ambiguity has been largely discussed in the requirements specification field of research. 
Although policy ambiguity has been suggested as a barrier to policy compliance, the 
researcher did not find much research that has been conducted to review actual InfoSec 
policy documents for possible ambiguities that might lead users to misinterpret the policy.  
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An overview of the different barriers to InfoSec policy compliance have been presented as 
a conceptual framework in Figure 2.1. 
The lack of Management 
Support for Information 
Security.
Organizational culture
The importance of the human 
aspect for information security 
management
Information security policy 
clarity
Barriers to Information 
Security Policy Compliance
Information security policy, 
awareness and training
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework: Barriers to Information security policy compliance 
(Synthesised by researcher) 
Rees et al. (2003) point out that there is a challenge in keeping InfoSec policies consistent; 
while Doherty, Anastasakis & Fulford (2009) report that an effective InfoSec policy document 
can reduce security breaches. The focus of this study was therefore on InfoSec policy clarity, 
as depicted in the shaded part of Figure 2.1 on the left hand side, which reflects the 
conceptual framework for the study. 
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InfoSec policy clarity as a policy compliance barrier could have a negative ripple effect on 
all the other barriers regardless of how well they have been addressed. Therefore, there 
should be more focus on increasing policy clarity and reducing ambiguity. No matter how 
much top management commitment or participation is provided to InfoSec management, an 
unclear policy could just as well lead the same top management to non-compliance by 
misinterpretation. The same goes for changing the organisational culture and increasing 
InfoSec policy awareness and training.  
 
The presence of ambiguity within the InfoSec policy document could render these efforts 
futile. Therefore, it is becoming essential to investigate the problem of ambiguity in order to 
get a better understanding and subsequently address the problem. The next section 
discusses the different types of ambiguity from academic literature. 
 
2.7. Types of ambiguity 
Ambiguity occurs when words or even images have more than one possible interpretation 
in terms of their meaning (Rees et al., 2003). The term ‘ambiguity’ was used to refer to a 
single word with multiple meanings (Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa, 2014). The multiple 
meanings reduce clarity of the message delivered. Ambiguity can be beneficial when used 
intentionally in art, literature, humour and poetry. It can be enchanting in literature, as it 
allows one to use one’s imagination to create meaning and therefore makes the literature 
captivating and enchanting (Bucaria, 2004). One example of beneficial ambiguity is per the 
below quote (McCloskey in Ryan, 2014): “I know that you believe you understand what you 
think I said, but I’m not sure you realise that what you heard is not what I meant”. 
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Although ambiguity can be beneficial, it can also be a limitation in instances where the reader 
or listener in communication has to make decisions based on the message communicated 
to him or her, but the message happens to be an ambiguous statement. This would reduce 
the level of decision precision, as the statement would be prone to misinterpretation. Kamp 
and Uwe (1993) draw attention to the idea that languages are for message exchange and 
sharing meaning. They reflect this phenomenon in yet another way by using a 
communication analogy, suggesting the speakers should clearly articulate or verbalise their 
thoughts and the hearers should discern meaning from the words that they have heard.  
 
This is applicable to speaking or writing as well as hearing or reading. Kamp and Uwe (1993) 
further suggest that communicators should find the words that are relevant to the content or 
message to be conveyed to ensure that the recipient can identify the content from the 
received words in a message. Computational linguistics literature refers to six kinds of 
ambiguity as follows:  
 
Lexical ambiguity  
This occurs when multiple meanings of one word cause a single word or a string of words 
to be interpreted in different ways, because some words have more than one meaning 
(Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990); for example, the word ‘bank’ can refer to a slope side 
of a river or a business establishment. 
 
Structural ambiguity 
This is also called syntactic ambiguity or grammatical ambiguity, and occurs in sentences 
where the meaning of each word is clear, but the words of a sentence are related to one 
another in various ways (Empson, 2004); for example, “She saw a man with binoculars”. 
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Does it mean that she looked through binoculars and saw a man, or does it mean she saw 
a man, and he had binoculars with him?   
 
Semantic ambiguity  
This occurs when even after the syntax and the meanings of the individual words have been 
resolved, there are two ways of reading the sentence. One indicator signifies more than one 
concept (Abbott, 1997); for example, “John kissed his wife, and so did Sam” (Sam kissed 
John’s wife or his own?) 
 
Anaphoric ambiguity  
This type of ambiguity occurs when a phrase or word refers to something previously 
mentioned, but there is more than one possibility; for example, “Margaret invited Susan for 
a visit, and she gave her a good lunch” (she = Margaret; her = Susan); “Margaret invited 
Susan for a visit, but she told her she had to go to work” (she = Susan; her = Margaret.) 
 
Durational ambiguity  
In this form of ambiguity, the duration unit of analysis is unknown but consequential (Abbott, 
1997). For example, “One should look left, then right for a reasonable period before crossing 
the road”. 
 
Omissions/Null pointer  
Ambiguity can also occur as a result of a statement/guideline or section that has been 
omitted from a policy document, in other words, ambiguity by omission (Abbott, 1997).  
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The above ambiguity types were used to derive the themes for the content analysis coding 
scheme listed in Table 3.3 in Chapter 3. InfoSec policy non-compliance has been studied 
comprehensively. On the other hand, to the knowledge of the researcher there is little 
available research related to the wording of InfoSec policies and the presence of ambiguity. 
The available research has focused on software requirements, system security policies and 
password policy.  
 
2.7.1. The ambiguity problem occurrences 
Before InfoSec policy users can execute the policy statements, they first have to interpret 
such statements before making the decision on which statement to execute and how to 
execute it. It is in this interpretation process where policy statements can be misinterpreted 
and wrongfully executed in the presence of ambiguity. 
 
Below are some of the ambiguities that were noted in InfoSec policy details. These 
ambiguities are also reported by Kolkowska & Dhillon, (2013), where an InfoSec policy 
description was inconsistent due to the conflict in functional rules and where several security 
objectives might have been contradicting each other, a view supported by Doherty, 
Anastasakis & Fulford (2009).  
 
During the content analysis of the policy document OP2, a document collected online. While 
working towards deriving and establishing the final content analysis themes. It was noted in 
this document’s access control section that: 
“[u]sers should have unique combinations of usernames and passwords” (Hostland 
et al., 2010:21).  
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However, the requirement does not provide details of the username or password structure 
to ensure uniqueness. This requirement statement is open-ended as compared to its 
counterpart in the InfoSec regarding physical conditions, which states that: 
“[a]ll external doors and windows must be closed and locked at the end of the work 
day” (Hostland et al., 2010:16).  
 
The above requirements come from the same InfoSec best practice document, and contain 
different levels of detail. In the same way as the comparison in the previous paragraph, there 
is a level of assumed reader implicit knowledge in the first requirement and the latter is 
explicitly stated in clear terms. This is an example of some requirements being vaguely 
stated and others in specific elaborate details in the same policy document, which leaves 
the interpretation to the background knowledge of the reader and causes discrepancies.  
 
Further examples of vague specifications contrasted with elaborate ones are documented 
below as noted from the Princeton University Information Security Policy (Princeton 
University, 2009): 
 
Example of vagueness: “Users should lock or log off their computers before leaving them 
unattended” (Princeton University, 2009:15). It appears as though the users are encouraged 
to leave their computers unattended. Also, it is not entirely clear when a computer is not 
attended to – user still in visual range of the computer, or user left the room. 
 
Elaborate example: “Tangible records (paper documents, microfilm, etc.) containing 
Confidential or Highly Confidential information must be:  
 stored in a locked cabinet or drawer when not in use with access limited to 
authorized individuals, and  
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 physically shredded/destroyed when no longer needed” (Princeton 
University, 2009:16). 
The above are detailed situations and associated actions. 
Example of vagueness: “Computers should be configured to ‘time out’ after no more than 
20 minutes of inactivity” (Princeton University, 2009:15). After how many minutes of inactivity 
should the computers be configured to time out? It appears as though any number from 1 
to 20 minutes. 
 
Elaborate example: “Ensure that any system is configured to keep a record of:  
 Who attempted to log into the system (successfully and unsuccessfully) and 
when,  
 When they logged out,  
 Administrative activity performed,  
 Unsuccessful attempts to access confidential and highly confidential files” 
(Princeton University, 2009:15).  
The requirements are clear on what activities should be logged.  
 
Generally, some of the documents that are faced with the ambiguity problem include, but 
are not limited to, software requirements specification documents, system security policies, 
password policies and user information security policies. 
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2.7.1.1. Software requirements specification 
Sommerville (2013) reports on the ambiguity of natural language in the field of software 
engineering, where there were problems noted when natural language was used for 
software requirements specifications. Lack of requirement clarity was identified, which 
affected the precision of the requirements. Requirements were confusing in a way that 
resulted in functional and non-functional requirements being confused, where functional 
requirements were mistaken for non-functional requirements and vice versa.  
 
Somerville (2004) also noted requirements amalgamation where several different 
requirements could have been expressed as one requirement. The researcher postulates 
that these challenges are not unique to software requirements specifications and could also 
be extended to the InfoSec space, where ambiguity can be a problem in the specification 
and documentation of InfoSec policies. 
 
2.7.1.2. System security policy 
In the case of system security policy research, software solutions were recommended to 
automate the process of ambiguity detection and resolution (Singh, Ramakrishnan, 
Ramakrishnan, Stoller & Warren, 2007). The study by Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa (2014) 
was conducted in order to address the ambiguity that could arise in instances where the 
human and the computer or one computer and another have different understandings of the 
same terms, i.e. where terms can generate ambiguity. Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa (2014) 
reason that naturally, computers are better than humans in performing calculations of 
complex numerical values as well as in remembering things, but not in integrating and 
sharing knowledge from different sources with different semantics, vocabulary and contexts 
(Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa, 2014).   
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People are better at integrating knowledge because they can consult, discuss and debate 
with one another to arrive at a common solution to a problem (Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa, 
2014). Although humans have been regarded to be better than computers in dealing with 
ambiguity in their day-to-day communication, they are not exempted from the problem of 
misinterpreting ambiguous terms (Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa, 2014). 
 
2.7.1.3. Password policy  
The work of Tryfonas & Askoxylakis (2015) focused on password policy ambiguity. Tryfonas 
& Askoxylakis (2015) conducted a study in which they developed methods and tools for 
studying and clarifying system password policy statements in order to reason about the 
relationship between the system password policy and the system user behaviour. The 
authors found there were ambiguities present in password policies. These ambiguities could 
alter user behaviour in the form of policy misinterpretation, and such misinterpretation could 
lead to policy non-compliance by users (Tryfonas & Askoxylakis, 2015). 
 
Furnell (2007) conducted a study in which he reviewed the password management guideline 
sections of ten website policies and found that password policies that ignored human factors 
could lead to poor security. There is an emerging importance placed on the relevance of 
policy content affecting user compliance. Mannan & Oorschot (2008) conducted a survey 
among online banking users, and found that user practices were not in line with the bank-
provided guidelines.  
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2.7.1.4. User information security policy 
InfoSec policy users are subjected to multiple, different policies at home and at work 
(Doherty, Anastasakis & Fulford, 2009; Tryfonas & Askoxylakis, 2015; Whitman & Mattord, 
2012). Some of the policies that could govern a typical InfoSec policy user include policies 
for access to and handling of corporate documents, personal financial information, online 
shopping content, social media content, personal medical records as well as smart fitness 
device content. According to Tryfonas & Askoxylakis (2015), ambiguities contained in 
policies and user misinterpretation of the password policies could have a major, negative 
impact on an organisation’s InfoSec compliance.   
 
The password policy is often documented as a section within the InfoSec policy document. 
Therefore, the applicability of the findings by Tryfonas & Askoxylakis (2015) could be 
validated against the full InfoSec policy document. Similarly, the presence of ambiguity in 
the full InfoSec policy could bear negative consequences for user compliance. This study 
explored whether it is the policy documents that pose a compliance problem by containing 
ambiguities that could lead the users to executing the policy statements incorrectly as a 
result of possible policy misinterpretations.  
 
Literature has suggested some solutions to ambiguity as it occurs in requirements 
specification documents. The next section discusses some suggested solutions. 
 
2.7.2. Proposed solutions to ambiguity 
Hinchey & Bowen, (1996), Parkin, Van Moorsel & Coles, (2009), and Tjong, (2013), have 
suggested the following strategies to reduce ambiguity in requirements specification, and 
they could be tested for applicability to reduce ambiguity in InfoSec policies:  
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 Ontologies 
 Automated disambiguation tools such as SREE (Synthesized Requirements 
Engineering Environment) 
 Manual analysis 
 Formal methods. 
 
For the purpose of this study, manual analysis and formal methods were used and tested 
as possible solutions to derive the frameworks for resolving ambiguity in InfoSec policy 
documents.  Formal methods have previously been reported to have been applied reduce 
ambiguity in natural language text (Hinchey, Bowen & Rouff, 2006; Do Amaral, Bazilio, Da 
Silva, Rademaker & Haeusler, 2006). 
 
2.7.2.1. Ontologies 
An ontology is a model to represent knowledge (Guarino & Giaretta, 1995). It consists of a 
set of concepts in a domain, as well as relationships between these concepts (Guarino & 
Welty, 2004). An ontology depicts knowledge as a model.  
 
Parkin, Van Moorsel & Coles (2009) developed an InfoSec ontology to better understand 
human behavioural factors in the InfoSec space. Things are described as classes in relation 
to one another. 
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Ontological notation: 
             Relationship 
 
 
 
For example: 
 
 
 
 
Ontologies have also been used for the speech recognition aspect of intelligent applications 
as a formal knowledge representation; for example, the Seri tool used by the Apple iPhone, 
where a phone user dictates to the phone what actions the phone should take, such as “Call 
John Doe”, after which the phone processes the instructions. 
  
Some of the ontology-related research was conducted in the area of machine learning. 
Ontologies in machine learning have been used to manage the knowledge that the 
computers acquire and reduce the probability of the same terms being understood differently 
by different computer machines (Guarino & Welty, 2004; Parkin, Van Moorsel & Coles, 
2009). The ontologies were also applied by Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa (2014) as a 
technique for representing specific knowledge that is saved in each computer and to find the 
correspondences between the concepts used in those ontologies. Since this research opted 
for the use of manual techniques and formal methods, further discussion of ontologies is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
Class 
Institution 
Has 
Policy 
InfoSec Policy 
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2.7.2.2. Automated tools 
Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa (2014) reason that computers are naturally better than 
humans in performing calculations of complex numerical values as well as in remembering 
things, but not in integrating and sharing knowledge from different sources with different 
semantics, vocabulary and contexts (Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa, 2014). People are 
better at integrating knowledge because they can consult, discuss, debate with each other 
to arrive at a common solution to a problem (Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa, 2014). 
 
Although people have been regarded to be better than computers in dealing with ambiguity 
in their day-to-day communication, they are not exempted from the problem of 
misinterpreting ambiguous terms (Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa, 2014).  
 
The existence of ambiguity has been largely discussed in the requirements specification 
field of research, for example “When a user fails to authenticate after a number of times, 
send a notification to IT” (Jayadianti, Nugroho, Santosa, 2014). In this example, it is not clear 
how many times “a number of times” is. The programmer cannot simply set a random limit 
such as a thousand times in the case of automation. 
 
Many automatic tools for ambiguity detection have been investigated in literature. These 
tools were used to detect ambiguity in requirements specifications that were expressed in a 
natural language (Tjong, 2013). The automated ambiguity detection tools were parsers- and 
parts-of-speech-identifier-based, such that they identify ambiguity by labelling each word as 
a part of speech in order to find the ambiguity in the requirements specifications. The tools 
were commonly referred to as ambiguity finding tools (AFT).  
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Wills, Chantree & De Roeck (2008) designed a prototype AFT called SREE. They tested the 
prototype and found that it did not achieve its goals. SREE was built mainly for use with 
requirements analysis. Most literature on ambiguity in the information systems and computer 
science fields has focused on tool-assisted ambiguity detection and disambiguation using 
AFTs.  
 
The use of such tools still required a manual ambiguity search process, which renders them 
imperfect on real natural language text (Tjong, 2013). Therefore, the tools would not be a 
practical solution for disambiguating InfoSec policy documents, if a manual ambiguity search 
would be necessary in addition to using an AFT (Gleich, Creighton & Kof, 2010). 
 
The AFTs were built with a corpus of specific domain knowledge from Software 
Requirements and Software development. A tool corpus for InfoSec policy knowledge would 
have to be built, populated and tested with multiple iterations in order to include an 
exhaustive list of relevant indicators from InfoSec. The InfoSec domain corpus would have 
to use prototypes to evolve and further develop the corpus detail, as well as tool recall and 
precision.  
 
2.7.2.3. Manual analysis 
In their 2008 study, Kiyavistkaya, Zeni, Mich & Berry (2008) used 17 requirements 
specification statements to conduct a manual ambiguity identification process in order to 
identify ambiguities in requirements specification documents that could have been missed 
by a LOLITA-based automation tool, which they refer to as T1. Their final output consisted 
of tool analysis as well as a manual analysis, which they refer to as the inspection approach. 
Their results indicated that manual analysis proved to be more effective in identifying 
ambiguities. 
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For this research, there was no tool use in order to facilitate the replication of the process 
and techniques proposed in this research work , because the tool requires some technical 
knowledge to set it up, which some of the InfoSec policy writers might not possess. However, 
the manual analysis was presented with clear instructions for the process that was followed. 
This research followed a manual analysis process similar to the manual analysis of 
Kiyavistkaya et al. (2008), which was applied to the InfoSec policy documents.  For this 
research, formal methods were tested in providing clarity and reducing ambiguity. The next 
section discusses formal methods. 
 
2.7.2.4. Formal methods 
Formalisms, also referred to as formal methods, are mathematical ways of representing 
information (Hinchey & Bowen, 1996). There are a variety of mathematical modelling 
techniques that are often applied to computer systems design, system specification, 
program verification, specification analysis and proof (Hinchey, Bowen & Rouff, 2006). 
These formalisms are mathematical and formal logic approaches to software and system 
development, as they exploit the power of mathematical notation and proofs (Hinchey & 
Bowen, 1996).  
 
Formalisms are sometimes said to guarantee that software is perfect, work by proving that 
programs are correct, involve complex mathematics, increase the cost of development, are 
incomprehensible to clients and nobody uses them for real projects (Geyer-Schulz & Chuck 
Dyer, 2004). However, since such software has to run in the real-world, these are some of 
the myths about formal methods (Rademaker & Haeusler, 2006).  
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It has been suggested that formal methods could improve InfoSec policies and render them 
more precise and comprehensible (Hinchey, Bowen & Rouff, 2006). Do Amaral, Bazilio, Da 
Silva, Rademaker & Haeusler (2006:20), put it in this way: “Formalized policies are more 
precise than their informal counterparts; in what concerns communication”. These authors 
recommend the use of formalisation to extract the semantics of the intended action 
statements from security policies. This was consistent with the intended results for this 
research, using a formalism that is user-friendly and enables comprehensibility and ease of 
implementation by users (Hinchey & Bowen, 1996).  
 
Hinchey, Bowen & Rouff (2006) identified precision, conciseness, abstraction and reasoning 
as the main benefits of using formal methods in documenting specifications. These benefits 
were detailed as follows: precision to reduce ambiguity of natural language, conciseness to 
make the document easier to comprehend, and abstraction and reasoning to facilitate 
validation of the specification using mathematical reasoning. Meyer (1985) states that he 
supports the use of formal specifications to complement instead of replacing natural 
language descriptions.  
 
Hinchey and Bowen (1996) write they have seen the development of formal methods from 
being used for software specifications in the 1980s to policies in the 2000s. This shows the 
formal method application improvements made over 20 years. This research aimed to make 
a contribution to the noted improvements. 
 
This research applied formal methods as possible solution to determine whether formal 
methods could improve on the InfoSec policies and render them more precise and 
comprehensible (cf. Hinchey, Bowen & Rouff, 2006).  
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2.7.2.5. Formal methods use 
The use of formal methods has previously focused on the software engineering space; 
however, their use is slowly progressing to include system security specifications (Hinchey, 
Bowen & Rouff, 2006). A formal specification is also referred to as a logic; logic can be seen 
as the study of correct reasoning (McCawley, 1981; Shapiro, 2000), which, according to 
Almeida, Frade, Pinto, & de Sousa (2011), is a study of the principles of reasoning. Logic 
reasoning is about situations and constructing arguments about these situations.  
 
A logic or formal specification consists of three aspects, reported by Do Amaral, Bazilio, Da 
Silva, Rademaker & Haeusler (2006) as: 
 Syntax or logical language: These include grammatical rules to determine whether 
sentences are well formed. It is a language in which sentences are expressed each 
with their own logical symbols with defined and fixed/rigid interpretation, and non-
logical ones with flexible, non-fixed interpretations. These symbols can be combined 
to form well-formed formulas). 
 Semantics: These are rules for interpreting the sentences in a precise, meaningful 
way within the domain. It differentiates valid sentences from refutable ones. Semantics 
is defined in terms of the truth values of sentences using an interpretation function that 
assigns meaning to the basic concepts within the domain.  
 Proof theory/Inference system: These are rules for inferring useful information from 
the specification. These rules support the formalisation of arguments, justifying the 
validity of sentences. 
 
There are three well-known logics as reported by Almeida et al. (2011). These are 
propositional logic, first-order logic and higher-order logic. First-order logic is the most 
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commonly used due to its expressiveness and ease of use (Do Amaral, Bazilio, Da Silva, 
Rademaker & Haeusler, 2006). Meaning in propositional logic is context-independent, unlike 
natural language, where meaning depends on context. Propositional logic has very limited 
expressive power. It has been referred to as a weak language, because it is hard to identify 
‘individuals’ (e.g. Mary, 3) and one cannot use propositional logic to directly talk about 
properties of individuals or relations between individuals (e.g. “Bill is tall”). 
 
First-order logic (abbreviated FOL; also referred to as first-order predicate calculus [FOPC]) 
is expressive enough to concisely represent this kind of information. FOL adds relations, 
variables and quantifiers, e.g.: 
 “Every elephant is grey”:  x (elephant(x) → grey(x)) 
 “There is a white alligator”:  x (alligator(x)  white(x)) 
 
Propositional logic assumes the world contains facts, whereas FOL (like natural language) 
assumes the world contains: 
 Objects: people, houses, numbers, colours, baseball games 
 Relations: sibling of, larger than, part of, comes between 
 Functions: parent of, best friend, one more than, plus.  
 
FOL has the following constructs (Do Amaral, Bazilio, Da Silva, Rademaker & Haeusler, 
2006):  
 Constant 
 Variable 
 Predicate 
 Function 
 Connective 
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 Quantifier 
 
Syntax of FOL: Basic elements 
 Constant symbols: King John; 2; University of Johannesburg  
 Predicate symbols: Brother; >  
 Function symbols: Sqrt; LeftLegOf   
 Variable symbols: x; y; a; b;  
 Connectives: , , , ,  
 Equality: = 
 Quantifiers: ,    
o Universal: x  
o Existential: x   
 Punctuation: ( ) 
 
2.7.2.6. The use of FOL constructs (quantifier scope) 
FOL allows variable arguments. These are quantified in two 
ways: existentially and universally (Geyer-Schulz & Chuck Dyer, 2004; Do Amaral, Bazilio, 
Da Silva, Rademaker & Haeusler, 2006). 
The universal one is 
 x [Expression] - means (for all (x) Expression). 
 For example: 
o x [policy(x) => has-owner(x)]. 
o The expression in [] is the scope of variable x. 
 Existential quantification appears like 
o x [policy(x)] - means (exists (x) such that x is a policy) 
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o There is at least one x that make policy(x) true. 
 
Switching the order of universal quantifiers does not change the meaning:  
 (x)( y)P(x, y) ↔ (y)( x) P(x, y) 
Similarly, you can switch the order of existential quantifiers: 
 (x)( y)P(x, y) ↔ (y)( x) P(x, y)  
Switching the order of universals and existential does change the meaning:  
 Everyone likes someone: (x)( y) likes(x, y)  
 Someone is liked by everyone: (y)( x) likes(x, y) 
 
Figure 2.2 shows examples of the translation of English natural language (NL) statements 
to FOL. 
 
Figure 2.2: First order language translations (Almeida et al., 2011) 
   
  
 
 
 
 
M.P. Buthelezi: 47361921  
  
 
 
 
51 
 
 
 
Example 2.1 
Given an InfoSec policy p, FOL denotes such by saying “For all object p Policy (p)”. Then 
we are able to reason about this given policy per the below statements. 
 
NL: If a policy is formal, it has no ambiguity 

 FOL: [Policy (p) Formal (p)] Ambiguity (p)] 
 
 
NL: All formal policies have no ambiguity 
 
FOL:Policy (p)Formal(p)] Ambiguity (p) ] 
 
More translation examples from English to FOL: 
 
No documentation language is perfect (two ways) 
x documentation (x)  language (x)  perfect (x)  
x (documentation(x)  language (x))  perfect(x)  
 
This research aimed to apply the FOL reasoning to InfoSec policies such that the arguments 
are valid and can be rigorously defended (cf. Almeida et al., 2011). Formal logic was applied 
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to the InfoSec policies. Broadly speaking a formal logic is a language with rules that 
determine whether the truth of one sentence can be derived from the truth of other sentences 
(Almeida et al., 2011). This aspect of logic was useful for the interpretation of InfoSec 
policies to ensure that the truth of the translated statement is maintained. 
 
2.8. Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the literature review conducted on InfoSec policies and higher 
education research areas to inform the research process. The literature has assisted the 
researcher to support and counter aspects of the proposed argument and assumptions.  
 
In the next chapter, the research methods and philosophical perspective of the research are 
presented as well as the research design and methodology applicable to the study. The 
chapter acts as a point of departure and roadmap for the research journey.  
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Chapter 3 
Research design and methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the academic literature that relates to the research topic. 
This chapter presents the research design and methodologies followed in achieving the 
research objectives set for this study and addressing the research questions, including 
discussions on how the data was collected and analysed. The structure of this chapter was 
guided by the sequence of the layers in the structure of the research onion as seen in Figure 
3.1 (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009).  
 
Positivism
                                        Interpretivism
Realism
Inductive
Deductive
         
            
Research philosophy
      
 Qualitative
  
                       Quantitative
                
       
Experiment
Survey
                 
Case study
                            Archival study
       Ethnography
           Grounded theory
    
   
        
            Cross-sectional
     Longitudinal
Surveys
Literature analysis
Documents
Questionnaires
Interviews
Observations
Data collection and 
analysis
techniques/ procedures Time horizons Research  strategies Research approachesResearch methods
 
Figure 3.1: The research onion adapted from Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, (2009) 
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The research onion was developed by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, (2009), to indicate the 
key stages through which a researcher should pass in order to have an effective research 
methodology for a research project.  
 
The research methodology discussion in this chapter starts with an overview of the research 
philosophy in section 3.2, and then the research approach is presented in section 3.3. 
Followed by an outline of the research methods in Section 3.4, and the research strategies 
in section 3.5.  Thereafter, Section 3.6 presents the research time horizons; Section 3.7 
provides the data collection and analysis techniques. And lastly, section 3.8 provides a 
concluding summary of chapter 3. The next section presents the research philosophy. 
 
3.2. Research philosophy 
The research philosophy reflects the researcher’s perspective and point of departure for the 
research, i.e. the nature of knowledge as seen by the researcher (Bryman, 2012). The 
research philosophy is also referred to as the philosophical paradigm. The research 
philosophy includes the researcher’s ontology, which is his or her belief about reality, and 
the researcher’s epistemology, which is his or her theory of how knowledge is acquired 
(Wynn & Williams, 2012). Oates (2006) defines ontology as the perception of the world and 
epistemology as the ways in which we gather knowledge about this world.  
 
There are three main philosophical paradigms that are commonly used to inform the 
research process, namely positivism, interpretivism and realism as depicted in the research 
onion per Figure 3.1 (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009; Flick, 2011). The epistemologies 
associated with these philosophical paradigms are empiricism, constructionism and critical 
realism respectively (Bryman, 2012). The words, “philosophical paradigm”, and 
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“epistemology” are often used interchangeably. Krauss (2005) defines epistemology as 
knowledge about knowledge.  
 
The research philosophies do not compete, but they differ based on the goals of the research 
project and are chosen based on the best one that might be used to achieve these goals 
(Goddard & Melville, 2004). The research philosophy is determined by the type of knowledge 
being investigated and the philosophy will guide the researcher into the relevant research 
methods (May, 2011). 
 
The associated ontologies refer to the researcher’s views of the nature of reality and these 
are: For positivism, reality is perceived as objective, external and independent of the social 
actors (Myers, 2013). In the interpretivist philosophy, the researcher ontology is that reality 
is subjective, dynamic, socially constructed, and there are multiple realities. For the realism 
paradigm, the reality is perceived to be objective, and that it exists independent of the human 
thoughts, knowledge or existence but this reality is interpreted through social conditioning 
(Creswell, 2014).  The most used philosophical paradigms in the information systems field 
are the positivist and interpretivist paradigms. A positivist believes that there is an absolute 
truth and that is the only truth. In this philosophy, the role of the researcher is to find the true 
answer and describe it.  
 
This research followed the interpretive philosophical paradigm with a constructivist 
epistemology and the ontology that reality is socially constructed as indicated with a tick 
mark in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: The research philosophies 
Philosophical 
paradigm 
Epistemology Ontology: Reality is 
 
Positivism Empiricism 
Objective and independent of the social 
actors. 
 
Interpretivism Constructionism Subjective and socially constructed. 
  
Realism Critical realism 
Objective, and exists independent of 
human thoughts, knowledge or existence, 
but through social conditioning. 
 
 
Table 3.1 has been used to highlight the research philosophies discussed in this section and 
emphasise the one that was selected and applied in this research study. 
 
An interpretivist is of the view that reality is too complex to control every variable in it. The 
role of the interpretivist researcher is to find a coherent way of understanding a situation 
within its natural setting. In critical theory, a critical researcher assumes that reality is socially 
constructed by people historically over time.  
 
The interpretivist paradigm is supported by Blaxter, Hughes & Tight (2006), Creswell (2009) 
and Mackenzie & Knipe (2006) as one that is suitable for a case study research method to 
develop a theory or observe trends in data as patterns of meaning. According to Wynn and 
Williams (2012), the interpretivist researcher tends to focus on understanding the subjective 
meanings within a context with reference to a specific phenomenon. Likewise, in this study, 
the researcher aimed to understand the existence of ambiguities that occur in InfoSec policy 
wording and the effect of such ambiguities on policy clarity and subsequent compliance.  
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The ontology associated with interpretivism suggests there is no single reality and that reality 
is socially constructed by the experiences of the researcher (Mouton, 2011; Oates, 2006). 
Similarly, the knowledge in this study was created from the researcher’s interpretation of the 
data collected. In this type of research, the researcher describes what he or she sees in the 
data and his or her reality is not created objectively per the empiricist epistemology (Oates, 
2006; Creswell, 2014). 
 
When cutting into the research onion, after the research philosophy layer, next is the 
research approach layer which is discussed in the following section. 
 
3.3. Research approach 
Research approaches explain the link between theory and reality (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
The research onion in Figure 3.1 presents two types of research approaches namely; the 
deductive and inductive approach as follows: 
3.3.1. Deductive Approach 
The deductive approach starts with developing a hypothesis, and then focuses on testing 
this hypothesis in the research process (Silverman, 2013). The deductive approach is used 
where the research project looks at whether the investigated phenomena prove or disprove 
the researcher expectations, relative to prior research (Creswell, 2014). The deductive 
approach has been considered to be more suitable for the positivist philosophy. 
 
When using the deductive approach, the research process includes a formulation and 
testing of hypotheses as well as statistical testing of results to an accepted level of probability 
(Silverman, 2013).  However, a deductive approach could also be used with the interpretive 
research philosophy, where prior research would be used to establish a general theory and 
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knowledge base against which the research results would be tested (Creswell, 2014).  
Therefore, the deductive approach develops from the general to the particular. On the other 
hand, the inductive approach moves from the specific to the general as further discussed in 
the next section (Bryman & Bell, 2015).  
3.3.2. Inductive Approach 
In the inductive approach, the researcher begins with an observation and searches for 
patterns in the data (Beiske, 2007). The inductive approach does not require a framework 
to inform the data collection and thus, the focus of the research can be established after the 
data collection stage (Flick, 2011).  This approach can be used to generate new theories; 
however, the results of the data analysis could end up fitting into an already existing theory 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
 
The inductive approach is more suited for the interpretive research philosophy. The inductive 
approach is seen to reduce potential researcher bias in the data collection stage of 
interpretive research where there is no theory used to inform the research process (Creswell, 
2014). However, this approach could also be used effectively with positivist research 
methodologies by analysing the data first, and thereafter using any significant patterns in 
the data to inform how the results are generated.  
 
This research followed an inductive, qualitative, exploratory content analysis method. 
Qualitative content analysis can be used inductively or deductively. Whether it is used 
deductively or inductively, the content analysis process consists of three main phases, 
namely: preparation, organisation, and reporting of results (Polit & Beck, 2012; Elo 
et.al.2015). An inductive content analysis was used for this study. 
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In the preparation phase, the researcher collects the suitable data and selects the analysis 
units (Baxter, 2009). The organistion phase involves creating the categories and coding the 
data (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). In the preparation phase of the inductive content analysis, the 
researcher performs open coding and abstraction, where the codes are created from the 
meaning found in the data (Baxter, 2009; Elo et.al, 2015). This is the same process that was 
followed for this study. 
 
For a deductive content analysis, the organisation phase involves developing the 
categorisation matrix, whereby all the data are reviewed and coded based on the codes 
from the pre-existing categorisation matrix (Polit & Beck, 2012; Riff, Lacy, & Fico, 2014). 
 
In the reporting phase, the results are described using the content of the categories used to 
represent and describe the phenomenon, either deductively or inductively (Palinkas, 
Horwitz, Green, Wisdom, Duan & Hoagwood, 2015). For the purpose of this study, inductive 
reporting was used. The research methodology for this study has been represented by use 
of a research onion diagram in figure 1. The research onion diagram is based on Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill’s diagram (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). 
 
Inductive means that you are researching to create theory. The process moves in the 
opposite direction to the deductive approach taking its focus from the working title of the 
researcher not the existing theory. This means the research goes from research question to 
observation and description to analysis and finally theory. Therefore, if little research exists 
on a topic then an inductive approach may be the best way to proceed (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2012). 
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Deductive means that you start with a statement or question and your research sets out to 
answer it. The aim would be to conclude with a yes or no response to the question. 
Questions may be statements or informed speculation about the topic that the researcher 
believes can be answered. The thought process of deduction moves from theory to the 
research question, to data collection, findings to a rejection or confirmation of the research 
question. This should lead to a revision of the theory and often starts the process over again 
(Saunders, Philip Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). 
 
The archival research strategy centres its data collection on existing data sets or archive 
documents. This allows for exploratory, explanatory or descriptive analysis. 
 
In order to generate results, there are research methods to be followed. The research 
methods are discussed in the next section. 
 
3.4. Research methods 
A research method is the manner in which the data is collected and analysed. It includes the 
underlying assumptions to the research design as well as the type conclusions drawn and 
generalisations made from the data (Myers, 2013).  
 
There are two prominent research methods, namely, the quantitative and qualitative 
methods. A third method can be derived by using a combination of the two, and is referred 
to as the mixed methods (Bryman & Allen, 2011; Creswell, 2014).  The type of method used, 
depends on the nature of the research, the research context and purpose (Myers, 2013). 
The two methods are discussed in the next sub-sections. 
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3.4.1. The Quantitative method 
The quantitative research method uses numerical data with the aid of statistical tools for 
analysis (Creswell, 2014).  The statistical tools used in quantitative methods are also used 
to test for the validity and reliability of the data analysis. Quantitative methods are often used 
to test theories or explanations and to prove or disprove hypotheses (Myers, 2013). The 
quantitative method can be used for the purpose of establishing cause and effect. 
 
This method is most effective when there is a large number of respondents available, and 
the data can be quantitatively measured using statistical methods and quantitative 
techniques (Bryman & Allen, 2011). The quantitative research method is informed by the 
positivist philosophy, whereas the qualitative method is informed by the interpretive research 
philosophy (Ezzy, 2013). The next section discusses the qualitative method in more detail. 
  
3.4.2. The Qualitative method 
The qualitative research method is usually used to examine the meaning of social 
phenomena, rather than seeking a causal relationship between established variables 
(Bryman & Allen, 2011; Creswell, 2014). Qualitative research involves studies that use 
textual data in the form of words or languages and do not use statistical procedures for data 
analysis (Leary, 2016).  
 
Qualitative methods are useful in obtaining an in-depth understanding of a particular 
situation (Mouton, 2011). Qualitative methods also help to obtain a detailed understanding 
of a specific context (Ezzy, 2013). This study used qualitative methods. The reason why this 
study followed a qualitative approach was to focus on the details of the Higher education, 
institutional InfoSec policy documents as the context and not a generalisation of a broad 
range of contexts, such as corporate InfoSec policy documents.  The choice of research 
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method, affects the research strategies to be used. The research strategies are discussed 
in the next section. 
 
3.5. Research Strategy 
A research strategy is a how the researcher plans to conduct the research work (Creswell, 
2014). The research strategy includes the way in which the research aim and objectives will 
be addressed and how the research questions will be answered (Ezzy, 2013). There are 
different research strategies available within information systems research, such as 
experiments, surveys, case studies, archival studies, ethnography, grounded theory, 
interviews and systematic literature review (Hofstee, 2006; Leary, 2016; Swanborn, 2010).  
 
This study used the case study research strategy. The case study strategy is about rich 
data, and having an in-depth look at the phenomenon under study, in its natural setting 
(Mouton, 2011).  The chosen case for this research was a University in South Africa, and 
unit of analysis was the InfoSec policy document of the chosen university.  The selected 
strategy was seen to be relevant and justified by the notion that it facilitated the answering 
of the chosen research questions posed in Chapter 1.  
 
A rationale for studying this particular case was that there were possible occurrences of 
ambiguities within InfoSec policies and any such occurrence could lead to user 
misinterpretation of the institutional InfoSec policies. The potential misinterpretation of the 
institutional InfoSec policies could subsequently lead the users to breach or violate the 
InfoSec policy resulting in non-compliance of the InfoSec policy.  
 
The selected case for analysis was therefore worth a comprehensive investigation, as it 
could contribute to an improvement in InfoSec policy compliance; thereby securing the 
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institution’s information systems from potential user-related security violations and reducing 
internal InfoSec threats.  
 
Within the research strategy in use, the researcher still has to select the period in which the 
research project would be conducted. This aspect is also referred to as the time horizon as 
discussed in the next section.  
 
3.6. Time horizon 
The time horizon is the period of time within which the research takes place, the time 
between the start and intended completion of the research (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 
2012). The research onion presents two types of time horizons, the longitudinal and cross 
sectional (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012).  
 
The longitudinal time horizon refers to performing repetitions of collecting data over a lengthy 
period of time (Goddard & Melville, 2004). The longitudinal time horizon is often used when 
one of the key research factors involves reviewing change over time (Mouton, 2011). This 
time horizon helps in studying development and change over time. 
 
A research project with a cross sectional time horizon refers to a research study where the 
data is collected at a point in time and not repeated (Bryman, 2012).  The cross sectional 
time horizon is also known as the ‘snapshot’ time collection, where the data collected is 
likened to taking a snapshot of the phenomenon under study, at that point in time (Flick, 
2011). The cross sectional time horizon is used to study a phenomenon at that particular 
time period. This research project used a cross sectional time horizon to study the InfoSec 
policy documents at a point in time. 
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The choice of time horizon is not reliant on the research approach (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2012). The choice of time horizon does however affect the data collection and the 
availability of data.  The following section presents more detail on the data collection and 
analysis techniques used in this study. 
 
3.7. Data collection and analysis techniques  
Data collection and analysis is dependent on the methodological approach used (Bryman, 
2012).  
 
3.7.1. Data sampling 
A random sample of InfoSec policy documents was collected online for the initial analysis. 
This initial analysis was done to derive, test and establish themes or categories to be applied 
to the chosen research sample of data. The data-collection instrument selected for use in 
this research was an online document collection of existing higher education InfoSec policy 
documents. 
 
Thereafter, a purposeful sampling strategy was used to select a sample case of one higher 
education institution in South Africa as it relates to the objectives of the study. (Gerring, 
2004; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Wynn & Williams, 2012). The InfoSec policies of the 
sampled institution were collected for data analysis. Before the documents could be 
collected from the institution, permission was sought from the institution to proceed with 
collection and analysis of the documents.  
 
The sampled institution had ten separate InfoSec-related policy documents. Therefore, the 
sample size collected was a total of ten InfoSec-related policies. The collected policies were 
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treated as sections of the same policy during the content analysis.  The policy names were 
as follows: 
 
The collected ICT policy documents were named P1 to P10 respectively for the sake of 
participant anonymity of the institution.  
Purposive sampling was used to select these policies for ease of access. All ten ICT policies 
from the institution were used. These constitute the complete population of the institution’s 
ICT-related policies.  
 
The policies were the following: 
 
 P1: Data Privacy Policy 
 P2: ICT Asset Disposal Policy 
 P3: ICT Mobile Device Policy 
 P4: ICT Policy on Broadband Agreements 
 P5: Information Security Policy 
 P6: Interception and Monitoring Policy 
 P7: Internet and Electronic Communication Policy 
 P8: Policy on Sending SMS and Emails to Students 
 P9: Telephone and Cellphone Policy 
 P10: Data Backup Policy 
 
In general, an institution could have one InfoSec policy with subsections addressing other 
InfoSec aspects as subsections; alternatively, an institution could have a separate sub-
policy for each InfoSec subsection. The scope of this research was limited to user InfoSec 
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policies and did not extend to the inclusion of system InfoSec policies. The next section 
discusses how the collected data was analysed. 
 
3.7.2. Data analysis  
A case study approach with a thematic content analysis was used. Mackenzie and Knipe 
(2006) confirm that document analysis could be used with a case study method. The AtlasTi 
qualitative data analysis software program was used to perform the content analysis and 
coding process (AtlasTi, 2016). A process of emergent thematic content analysis was 
employed to interpret the raw data (cf. Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Stemler, 2001). 
Content analysis is defined as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many 
words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006).  
 
Content analysis enables researchers to analyse large volumes of data with relative ease in 
a systematic fashion (Stemler, 2001; Riff, Lacy, & Fico, 2014). The data-coding approaches 
available for document analysis are a priori coding and emergent coding schemes. With a 
priori coding, the categories are established prior to the analysis; whereas with emergent 
coding, the categories are established based on some initial examination of the data 
(Boyatzis, 1998). The emergent coding scheme was applied in this study. 
 
The researcher decided on the categories as guided by the literature as well as patterns in 
the data, and the coding was applied to the data. InfoSec policy statements were reviewed 
for ambiguity, and the ambiguous statements were grouped into different categories. Data 
with similar characteristics were grouped into the same category. Revisions were made as 
necessary, and the categories were revised to an extent of maximising mutual exclusivity 
and exhaustiveness (Hofstee, 2006; Riff, Lacy, & Fico, 2014).  
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Method rigor was demonstrated through the process of thematic analysis in which the 
collected data were examined and searched for themes that emerged and were noted to be 
indicating the presence of ambiguity, the phenomenon under study (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006). The content analysis process involved careful reading and re-reading of 
the data to identify similar features or any recurring patterns within the data. The emerging 
themes became the categories for analysis (Boyatzis, 1998).  
 
The policy documents were reviewed and analysed to identify the occurrences of ambiguous 
statements. The types of ambiguities identified within these policy documents were grouped 
by their common elements and categorised into themes (Oates, 2006). The occurrences of 
ambiguous statements in the policy were presented using a table as a visual aid to reflect 
the ambiguous aspect of the policy statements and their related category and depict any 
trends in the data (Oates, 2006; Riff, Lacy, & Fico, 2014). The researcher used the data 
analysis results to develop a framework for reducing the occurring types of ambiguities, so 
as to inform practice. 
 
Irrespective of the chosen research approach, there are two types of data that can be 
collected, secondary data and primary data. Secondary data are data that has been derived 
from prior research in the work of others (Newman, 1998). 
 
Primary data are data collected directly from the data sources (Bryman, 2012). Direct 
sources include survey or interview respondents, and existing documents (Flick, 2011). This 
study used primary data in the form of existing InfoSec policy documents.  When the aspects 
of the research onion layeys have been applied according to the research objectives, the 
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process followed in executing the steps is the research methodology. The research 
methodology for this research is discussed in the next section. 
 
3.8. Research methodology 
This section presents the research methodology, which is the research process that was 
followed for this study. A research methodology, also referred to as a research design is 
defined as a plan and description of how a research project was carried out (Mouton, 2011).   
The research design pays closer attention to the research artefact or end product.  
 
The methodology departs from the research problem and the type of data required for 
addressing the research problem. And focuses on the research tools used and procedures 
followed (Ezzy, 2013). The chosen methodology for this study applied qualitative tools and 
techniques, as they were most suitable in addressing the research objectives and answering 
the research questions posed in Chapter 1.  
 
The methodology includes the complete research process followed, starting with the 
identification and selection of suitable data sources, data collection tools, methods of 
analysis and subsequent interpretation of the results (Yin, 2009).  
 
Research methodology can be categorised as empirical or non-empirical. Empirical studies 
include quantifying and observing reality to subsequently verify knowledge through direct 
experience. Non-empirical studies, also referred to as theoretical studies, are concerned 
with exploring as well as developing theories that account for and justify the research data 
(Creswell, 2009). 
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Empirical studies could use textual data, numeric data or a combination of the two. When 
textual data such as words are used for an empirical study, the study would be categorised 
as a qualitative study. Alternatively, when numeric data are used, the study would be 
categorised as a quantitative study. A research design could also combine the qualitative 
and quantitative methods to achieve more reliable results than when using each method on 
its own (Ezzy, 2013). 
 
Mouton (2011) asserts that in terms of the research questions posed for a study, there is a 
differentiation between empirical and non-empirical questions. Empirical questions address 
real-life questions and non-empirical questions address theoretical or conceptual model 
questions. Empirical questions are said to involve non-scientific knowledge, which refers to 
lay, everyday knowledge; while non-empirical questions would involve generating valid, 
reliable descriptions, models and theories of the world in search of scientific truth (Mouton, 
2011). 
  
For the purpose of this study, the following non-empirical questions were posed in section 
1.5 of Chapter 1 as follows: 
 SRQ1: What does literature on InfoSec policies say about InfoSec policy issues? 
 SRQ 2: What are the main problems with InfoSec policy compliance? 
 SRQ 3: What are the main problems relating to ambiguity within InfoSec policies? 
 SRQ 4: How can InfoSec policy ambiguities be reduced to improve policy compliance 
and clarity? 
 
Non-empirical methods were followed in order to answer these research sub-questions. A 
literature review was conducted, which included a document analysis in order to address 
the first three research sub-questions. A model-building approach was used to answer the 
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fourth research sub-question. These methods used textual data and subsequently this study 
is categorised as a qualitative study. This study was therefore a non-empirical, qualitative 
study. 
 
3.8.1. The research process  
The research process was executed in the steps depicted in the conceptual framework in 
Figure 3.2. To address the first three research sub-questions, the research started with a 
systematic literature review. The literature review is presented in Chapter 4 as an analysis 
with its related results, with aspects of it in Chapter 2 as part of the foundational literature 
for the study. In addition, a document analysis was conducted on the contents of InfoSec 
policy documents sampled from a higher education institution. The results of the document 
analysis (content analysis) are presented in Chapter 4 as research findings.  
 
A model-building approach was used to build a framework and address research sub-
question 4. The model building is presented in Chapter 5 in the form of suggested solutions 
to reduce the occurrence of ambiguity in InfoSec policies. The model-building aspect of the 
study depended on the results of the document analysis from Chapter 4. Furthermore, 
application scenarios were provided to strengthen the validity and reliability of the research. 
The application scenarios were used to test the recommended theoretical solutions. These 
research process steps are diagrammatically represented in Figure 3.2. 
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Systematic literature 
review
(theoretical framework)
Content analysis 
(document review)
Application scenarios
(proof of concept)
Model building
(framework for reducing 
ambiguity)
 
Figure 3.2: The research process conceptual framework (Synthesised by researcher) 
 
The following sections discuss the research process of Figure 3.2, starting with the 
systematic literature review in section 3.8.2.  Followed by the content analysis in section 
3.8.3, the model building in section 3.8.4 and finally, the application scenarios in section 
3.8.5. 
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3.8.2. Systematic literature review 
A literature review is defined as a study that presents an overview of scholarship in a specific 
field through analysis of trends and the published work of others (Hofstee, 2006; Mouton, 
2011). A literature review relies on secondary literature to highlight trends in the research 
area at hand and it also helps in identifying empirical and theoretical weaknesses in the 
published works (Yin, 2009). These weaknesses are often referred to as the research gap 
(Leary, 2016).  
A literature review also constitutes a non-empirical study with the unit of analysis being data 
from the collected literature in the area of study (Mouton, 2011). In order to contextualise 
and understand how to address the research questions posed for this research project, it 
was necessary to determine what problems InfoSec policies presented by way of a literature 
review.  
A systematic literature search was performed to gather background literature on the work 
performed in the area of InfoSec policy compliance and to identify a research gap that this 
research project could address (Stemler, 2001; Yin, 2009). The choice of literature sources 
was based on the research objectives; questions to be addressed and the available time to 
conduct the study (Leary, 2016). Literature reviews use inductive reasoning to understand 
a said domain of scholarship from the chosen sample of reviewed text (Mouton, 2011). 
A systematic literature search process was adopted to ensure validity and reliability. In this 
review, reliability is based on selected databases, publications, the covered period and 
keywords used for the literature search, which are documented for replication of the 
literature search process. Academic articles in the field of InfoSec in policy management 
and the compliance contexts were included.  
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The rating of the journal, the research methodology and geographic region of the research 
were disregarded and not used as inclusion or exclusion categories. This was to ensure 
there is a sizeable collection of literature to review. However, non-academic articles (white 
papers and industry magazine articles) were excluded due to lack of methodological rigour. 
A language restriction was imposed, where only articles in English were included.  
In total, 382 articles were downloaded for further processing. The downloaded articles were 
screened to exclude those focused on testing user InfoSec awareness and 167 articles 
remained. To verify the relevance of the collected articles to the context under study, 
abstracts were read, and in some instances, other parts of articles were reviewed to identify 
the most relevant and applicable articles. As a result, 67 articles were deemed useful for this 
study. 
For reliability of the literature review, a list of keywords was developed prior to the literature 
search to focus on relevant studies (cf. Hofstee, 2006). The list of search keywords is noted 
in Table 3.2 and the searched databases are listed in Table 3.3. The results of the literature 
review are presented in Chapter 4. 
Table 3.2: List of keywords and phrases used for literature search  
# Searched keywords 
1 Information security policy issues 
2 IT security policy 
3 IT governance policy 
4 Information security management policy 
5 Security policy problems 
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6 Security policy compliance 
7 Information security policy management framework 
8 Information security framework 
 
Table 3.3: List of databases and search engine used for literature search 
No. Name of database No. Name of database 
1 Academic Search Complete 2 Brill 
3 Business Source Complete 4 Cambridge Journals Online 
5 Computers & Applied Sciences Complete 6 EBSCOhost EJS 
7 Emerald Management e-Journals 8 Sage Journals Online 
9 Science Direct 10 
Google Scholar (search 
engine) 
 
Soomro, Shah, & Ahmed (2016) conducted a similar literature study, as they investigated 
the necessity for what they refer to as a more holistic approach to InfoSec management. 
They found that technological InfoSec solutions are rapidly developed; however, InfoSec 
issues remain a huge challenge for organisations. They report that the challenges remain 
because these technological solutions depend on InfoSec policy and organisational 
strategies. Soomro, Shah, & Ahmed (2016) further concluded that security policies and 
organisational strategies should be explored from a managerial point of view.  
Grant, Edgar, Sukumar & Meyer, (2014) focused on literature in the decade between 2004 
and 2014, whereas in the current literature review, the period exclusion category was 
removed in order to capture even the earliest views recorded about the meaning of and need 
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for InfoSec policies. Therefore, the inclusion category for the collected literature was all 
periods to date, as the time when this study was conducted in 2016.  
Relative to the study by Soomro, Shah, & Ahmed (2016), which focused on recent 
developments of the past decade in the area of InfoSec management, this study focused 
particularly on the human aspects of InfoSec management as they relate to InfoSec policy 
use and awareness since inception of the information age. 
3.8.3. Content analysis 
In this research, an inductive process of emergent thematic analysis was employed in order 
to interpret the raw data (cf. Downe‐Wamboldt, 1992; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). A 
sample of higher education InfoSec policy documents collected online was inductively 
reviewed to derive themes from the data.  
 
These themes were later applied to categorise the ambiguities in the purposeful sample 
(refer to Section 4.3). 
 
Content analysis is defined as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many 
words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Stemler, 2001). 
Content analysis enables researchers to go through large volumes of data with relative ease 
in a systematic fashion (GAO, 1996). The data-coding approaches available for document 
review are a priori coding and emergent coding schemes (Downe‐Wamboldt, 1992; Fereday 
& Muir-Cochrane, 2006). With a priori coding, the categories are established prior to the 
analysis, whereas with emergent coding, the categories are established based on some 
initial examination of the data (Stemler, 2001). 
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3.8.3.1. Emergent data coding 
For this study, a template was developed based on the research questions and theoretical 
concepts (cf. Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). In order to understand how InfoSec policies 
are documented, an emergent coding approach to document reviews was conducted on a 
sample of InfoSec policy documents. Emergent coding is a deductive way of coding the data 
based on themes developed while analysing the data; the codes emerge from the data 
(Stemler, 2001). InfoSec policy documents as well as best practice documents were 
collected online and used for the document analysis. The emergent coding process was 
followed to develop themes from the statements and phrases in the policy documents that 
were reviewed.  
 
For this study, codes were written based on that of Boyatzis (1998) and identified by the 
following characteristics: 
 The code label or name  
 The definition of what the theme concerns  
 A description of how to know when the theme occurs. 
 
During data analysis, the process of emergent thematic content analysis was used in order 
to analyse and interpret the data. The emergent data-coding scheme was applied to the 
data. The ambiguity types were used as themes for coding the data. The resulting thematic 
codes are documented in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4: Ambiguity themes 
 
 
Each identified ambiguous phrase was categorised into the theme that best describes the 
phrase’s characteristics that make it ambiguous. From the six types of ambiguities from 
Code 
Thematic codes  
Code name Definition Description 
SeLA 
Structural/Semantic/Le
xical ambiguity 
Language-related 
Grammatically unclear and 
semantically ambiguous 
statements 
The statement is broad 
and could be abused to 
refer to unintended 
outliers. 
VID 
Vague/Implicit 
description 
Implicit statement 
The content is alluded to but 
not explicitly mentioned 
Assume user background 
knowledge 
The statement is vague 
and lacks clarity of detail. 
ONP Omission/Null pointer 
Content referred to is not 
available or accessible 
The statement refers to 
an item that is not at the 
said location. 
DN Double negative 
Statement uses two double 
negatives to infer a positive 
meaning, which could 
potentially be confusing  
User is told what not to do 
User first has to interpret the 
statement in terms of its 
positive version to find out 
what to do 
The statement is phrased 
using antonyms of the 
intended meaning with a 
negative connotation. 
CON Contextual 
Contextual misplacement 
Statement is placed in the 
wrong section of the 
document 
The statement is 
documented with 
unrelated statements in 
the document. 
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literature in chapter 2, the following themes were derived for this study: All the grammar-
related ambiguity types were grouped into the SeLA (structural/semantic/lexical ambiguity) 
theme; the implicit statements were grouped into the VID (vague/implicit description) theme; 
all the references made to documents that were not accessible were categorised into the 
ONP (omission/null pointer) theme; and the occurrence of double negatives was categorised 
into the DN (double negative) theme. Where a statement was documented in an unrelated 
policy section, the occurrences were categorised in the CON (contextual) theme for 
contextual misplacement as noted in Table 3.4.  
 
Once the themes were identified, the data were re-read and categorised into their most 
suitable respective themes. The identified ambiguous statements were grouped into 
different categories. The category names were derived from known types of ambiguities as 
noted from prior research per the literature review step of the research process. 
 
The phrases that possessed the properties of any of the listed themes were documented in 
a table and further reviewed for overlaps or further clarity. Some phrases were removed 
from the table after consultation and discussion with the research supervisors, i.e. those 
phrases were deemed subjective. These phrases were initially thought to have been 
unclear, but were deemed subjective given reasonable doubt. A secondary review of the 
documents P1-P10 was performed using AtlasTi to identify ambiguous words per the 
established themes from the initial analysis. 
 
The results of the coding process reflecting the subjective phrases from the reviewed 
policies are documented in Chapter 4. The following section discusses the model-building 
aspect of the study. 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
M.P. Buthelezi: 47361921  
  
 
 
 
79 
3.8.4. Model building 
According to Mouton (2011), model-building studies aim to explain the phenomenon under 
study by way of developing new theories and models. A model is a process or system outline 
used to clearly and concisely represent a certain phenomenon (Mouton, 2011; Leary, 2016). 
A model is an abstract representation of parts of the real world and represents the main 
aspects of a system or process, often omitting the nonessentials (Aveson & Fitzgerald, 
2006). A model represents a system in the form of its components, roles and interfaces 
within the system (Leary, 2016). The model generally provides a simplified, comprehensible, 
yet exact representation of the world, which makes it useful for problem solving in research 
(Leary, 2016). 
 
Model-building studies are also said to be non-empirical (Leary, 2016). These studies use 
secondary data from an existing body of knowledge, such as literature. Model building can 
be performed with deductive or inductive reasoning (Mouton, 2011). Deductive reasoning is 
more formal due to its use of a set of axioms formulated and used to deduce additional 
theoretical propositions. Alternatively, inductive reasoning is generally used in statistical 
model building, where a model is used to explain particular empirical data (Yin, 2009). For 
non-empirical qualitative research, inductive reasoning is often used. The same was used 
for this study to develop a framework for reducing ambiguity as it occurs within InfoSec policy 
documents. The model building aided the researcher in addressing the fourth research sub-
question. 
 
The results of the model-building aspect of the study are presented in Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation in the form of proposed solutions to the ambiguity problem. The next section 
explains the application of the model framework as a proof of concept. 
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3.8.5. Application scenarios 
Application scenarios were used in the study to provide an in-depth description of a limited 
number of case scenarios. Application scenarios allow specific cases to be focused on and 
studied in more detail without having implemented the model in real life (Aveson & 
Fitzgerald, 2006). Application scenarios were used in this study because the proposed 
framework had not been implemented at the time of this study. Application scenarios are 
empirical in nature and are suitable to be used in qualitative or quantitative studies (Leary, 
2016). 
 
There are two techniques that are often used for the selection of cases to use for application 
scenarios, namely literal replication and theoretical replication. For literal replication, the 
cases are chosen such that they use extreme cases to test the theory. In the theoretical 
replication instance, cases are selected such that the theory applies in some cases and not 
in others (Leary, 2016). 
 
The disadvantage of application scenarios, just like that of cases studies, is that it lacks the 
generalisation of results and non-standardisation of measurements (Mouton, 2011). To 
obtain more general results, multiple case scenarios are used.  
 
The potential bias of the researcher, especially in case selection, may lead to results of 
limited value (Mouton, 2011). The advantage of application scenarios is that they are able 
to combine qualitative and quantitative data in one case (Leary, 2016). The purpose of using 
application scenarios in this study was to apply the suggested solutions to the problem areas 
that were identified in the content analysis of the study and to demonstrate the utility of the 
suggested solutions as a proof of concept. The proof of concept was used in this study in 
order to strengthen the validity of the research results. The application scenarios were 
   
  
 
 
 
 
M.P. Buthelezi: 47361921  
  
 
 
 
81 
applied in the form of example applications of the different recommended solutions per 
problem category, as contained in Chapter 5.  
 
The next section discusses the steps followed to ensure that the research was performed 
ethically. 
 
3.9. Ethical considerations 
Ethical clearance was granted for the study by the research committee in the School of 
Computing at Unisa. This ethical clearance requires the researcher to maintain the 
confidentiality and anonymity of any parties who participated in the study, so that they are 
not easily recognisable as referred to in the study. The ethical clearance certificate is 
attached in Appendix A. 
 
3.10. Chapter summary 
This chapter provided the philosophical paradigm perspective of the research as well as the 
research design and methodology pertinent to the study. The chapter presented the 
processes and procedures followed in the study. These processes were informed by 
literature in selecting the most suitable research methods and tools for the chosen type of 
research. The data-collection tools and the data-analysis were also discussed.  
 
The next chapter discusses the research results and findings after the research methods 
were applied in the research process.  
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Chapter 4 
Data Analysis and Findings  
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the research process steps and related research methods 
that were applied in this study.  
 
The research aim for this study was to conceptualise a framework for addressing university 
InfoSec policy ambiguity, to aid InfoSec policy compliance.  
 
The research objectives for this study as noted in section 1.5.2 were:  
 RO1: Explore the literature on InfoSec policies; 
 RO2: Identify the main problems facing InfoSec policy compliance; 
 RO3: Identify the main problems relating to ambiguity within InfoSec policies; 
 RO4: Define how InfoSec policy ambiguity can be reduced to improve compliance 
and clarity 
 
The first and second research objectives, RO1 and RO2 were addressed in the form of a 
systematic literature review in section 4.2. The third research objective, RO3 was addressed 
by means of a content analysis in section 4.3. The fourth research objective was addressed 
by means of the proposed solutions and framework in Chapter 5. 
 
The next section reflects the research results and findings obtained after applying the 
research methods to address the research objectives. The result discussions include the 
outcome of the systematic literature review and the content analysis as discussed in the 
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research process and methodology of Chapter 3. The next section initiates the results 
discussion by presenting the results of the systematic literature review. 
 
4.2. Systematic literature review results 
In order to contextualise and understand this research, it was necessary to comprehend the 
challenges facing InfoSec policies. Therefore, a systematic literature search was performed. 
A rigorous literature search process was adopted to ensure validity and reliability. In this 
review, reliability is based on the selected databases, publications, the covered period and 
keywords and key phrases used for the literature search, which are documented for 
replication of the process.  
 
The systematic literature review included academic articles in the field of InfoSec policy 
management as well as the policy compliance. The list of databases is provided in section 
3.9.2 where the systematic literature review research process was presented in detail. 
Subsequently, this section presents the results of the systematic literature review. The 
following concepts emerged in the literature as the most occurring barriers to InfoSec policy 
compliance. 
 
4.2.1. Barriers to information security policy compliance 
During the analysis of the identified literature, which involved determining what other 
scholars have reported as the barriers to InfoSec policy compliance, the following were 
reported to be the main factors affecting compliance: 
 Lack of management support for information security presented in Table 4.1; 
 Organisational culture presented in Table 4.2; 
 Information security policy awareness and training in Table 4.3; 
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 The importance of the human aspect for information security management in Table 
4.4; and  
 Information security policy clarity in Table 4.5. 
The listed factors are discussed sequentially in the next sections. 
4.2.1.1. Lack of management support for information security 
In a study conducted by Humaidi & Balakrishnan (2015) among health professionals, their 
results indicated that management support, particularly leadership styles supportive of 
InfoSec initiatives, proved to influence InfoSec policy compliance behaviour, depending on 
whether the leadership was actively supportive of InfoSec initiatives. The InfoSec initiatives 
were more successful when management actively supported them. Further literature that 
presented similar views about management support for InfoSec is presented in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Relevant literature on lack of management support for information security 
Lack of management support for information security 
Author(s) & year Findings 
Chang & Ho (2006) 
A firm should have a comprehensive management structure and 
practices for InfoSec. There should be formal structures of InfoSec 
management within an organisation. 
Knapp, Morris, 
Marshall & Byrd, 
(2009) 
Top management support is the most critical issue of an InfoSec 
programme and its success. 
Ezingeard & 
Bowen-Schrire 
(2007) 
Top management interest and participation are vital for continued 
improvements within InfoSec systems. 
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Ma, Schmidt & 
Pearson (2009) 
Management support is possibly the most important component of 
effective InfoSec management. 
Hu, Dinev, Hart, & 
Cooke (2012) 
Top management participation in InfoSec management has a 
significant influence on employees’ attitude and behaviour in terms of 
their compliance with InfoSec policies. 
Whitman & Mattord 
(2012) 
Safe and secure operation of information assets is a senior 
management responsibility. 
Kwon et al. (2012) 
Top management involvement in policy formulation has a positive 
impact on InfoSec effectiveness. 
Phillips (2013) 
Management practices have a significant role in IT system 
effectiveness. 
 
Table 4.1 presented the most significant literature indicating that one of the problems with 
InfoSec policy compliance is the lack of management support.  Therefore, it becomes clear 
that active and supportive management attitudes towards InfoSec initiatives within 
organisations, including higher education institutions could improve the InfoSec policy 
compliance. The participation of top management participation in InfoSec initiatives has 
been noted to have a significant impact on employees’ attitudes towards policy compliance 
(Hu, Dinev, Hart and Cooke, 2012). 
 
Organisational culture was the next significant aspect affecting InfoSec policy compliance, 
according to the systematic literature review. The organisational culture as it relates to 
InfoSec policy compliance is discussed in the next section.   
4.2.1.2. Organisational culture  
Organisational culture can affect user compliance with the InfoSec policy, based on what is 
deemed as acceptable behaviour among fellow employees. Siponen & Vance (2010) refer 
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to this phenomenon as an ‘appeal to higher loyalties’. Table 4.2 presents more literature 
related to organisational culture and how it affects compliance. 
 
Table 4.2: Relevant literature on organisational culture 
Organisational culture 
Author(s) & year Findings 
Da Veiga & Eloff, (2010) 
A security conscious organisational culture can help improve 
InfoSec policy compliance. 
Thomson, Von Solms & 
Louw, (2006) 
Organisations should be more receptive of InfoSec initiatives. 
Siponen & Vance 
(2010) 
Policy users will comply with the policy if compliance is perceived 
positively by their colleagues and therefore Organisational culture 
affects InfoSec policy compliance.  
Van Niekerk, , R. Von 
Solms (2010) 
Cultivating an organisational sub-culture of InfoSec can help 
address the problem of users violating the policy, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally and thereby addressing the “insider 
human threat” to InfoSec. 
Crossler, Johnston., 
Lowry, Hu, Warkentin & 
Baskerville (2013) 
It is important organisational management teams to encourage a 
culture of InfoSec awareness and compliance. A culture of 
compliance could reduce policy violations.  
 
A security-aware culture would encourage InfoSec policy compliance (Da Veiga & Eloff, 
2010). Organisations should cultivate an InfoSec-receptive culture (Thomson, Von Solms & 
Louw, 2006).  
 
The next barrier that was reported to be affecting user compliance is the InfoSec policy 
awareness and training. This concept is discussed in the following section. 
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4.2.1.3. Information security policy awareness and training 
There is great importance placed on user InfoSec awareness and training for better InfoSec 
policy compliance (Danchev, 2003). Insufficient InfoSec policy awareness and training have 
been attributed to user non-compliance with the InfoSec policy (Siponen, Mahmood & 
Pahnila, 2014). Therefore, educating the users could increase policy compliance. Further 
literature discussing InfoSec policy awareness and training in relation to policy compliance 
has been presented in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Relevant literature on information security policy awareness and training 
Information security policy awareness and training 
Author(s) & year Findings 
Gerber, Von Solms & 
Overbeek (2001) 
Management should develop the InfoSec requirements to focus 
more on information and not only on infrastructure. 
They illustrate that InfoSec requirements could be used to 
determine the required level of InfoSec, as opposed to using a risk 
analysis. 
Danchev (2003) 
Security can be improved by properly educating staff on their role in 
protecting organisational resources. This education and training 
should be varied and evolving to keep the staff continuously 
interested and well informed. The education initiatives could include 
developing a security awareness programme, a security newsletter, 
security articles, explaining new threats and technology trends. 
Whitman (2004) InfoSec needs higher levels of awareness, education and policy. 
D'Arcy, Herath, & 
Shoss (2014) 
IT management should develop effective security policies, identify 
critical assets and encourage communication between IT and risk 
managers. 
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Chang & Lin (2007) 
Effective security policy and practice are vital for InfoSec, as 
technical measures alone are not sufficient for this purpose. 
Hagen, Albrechtsen & 
Hovden (2008) 
InfoSec awareness creation is more effective than other measures. 
Siponen, Mahmood & 
Pahnila (2009) 
The visibility of the InfoSec policy has a positive impact on 
employees’ behaviour towards policy compliance. 
Ma et al. (2009) 
InfoSec training is possibly the most important measure for its 
effectiveness, as it increases awareness and understanding. 
Doherty, Anastasakis 
& Fulford (2009) 
Security breaches can be reduced by protecting a firm’s information 
through an effective InfoSec policy. 
Puhakainen & 
Siponen (2010) 
InfoSec policy compliance training has a positive effect on 
employees’ behaviour in terms of compliance. 
Albrechtsen & 
Hovden (2010) 
Employee participation and knowledge creation incorporate positive 
changes towards InfoSec awareness and behaviour. 
Johnston & 
Warkentin (2010) 
Policies and user awareness training are necessary controls to 
support technical security controls. 
Rubenstein & Francis 
(2008) in Soomro, 
Shah, & Ahmed, 
(2016) 
A major internal threat to InfoSec is access policy violation with 
malicious intentions. 
Singh, Picot, Kranz, 
Gupta & Ojha (2013) 
A comprehensive policy and effective management process for its 
implementation are necessary for InfoSec management. 
Dagada & Eloff 
(2013) 
They found that some users perceive the InfoSec policy to be a 
nuisance, as it restricts user freedom to particular aspects in the 
information systems. 
Siponen et al. (2014) 
InfoSec awareness has a significant impact on employees’ 
compliance with InfoSec policies. 
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Parsons et al. (2014) 
Awareness training and education have a positive impact on 
employee attitude and behaviour towards InfoSec policy. 
 
Table 4.3 presented the most significant literature on InfoSec policy awareness and training 
and how it affects policy compliance. Essentially, awareness and training have been 
reported to increase compliance, by use of quantitative studies (Albrechtsen & Hovden 
2010; Parsons et al., 2014).  
 
The next concept affecting InfoSec policy compliance was reported to be the human aspects 
of information security, generally referred to as human vulnerabilities and human error. This 
concept is discussed in the next section. 
 
4.2.1.4. Human aspects of information security management 
It is often said that the weakness of any security system are the human users (Parsons et 
al., 2014). This people-based weakness has also been referred to as human-based InfoSec 
vulnerabilities (Furnel & Peppard, 2007; Williams, 2008 ; Parsons et al., 2014).  
 
A 2010 study conducted in Malaysia reported that human error was one of the major internal 
threats towards implementation of the Health Information System (Narayana, Ahmad & 
Ismail, 2010). Human error caused InfoSec incidents because employees in the organisation 
lacked recognition of potential threat vulnerabilities, had undeveloped understanding of 
InfoSec and lacked knowledge of InfoSec (Humaidi & Balakrishnan, 2015). More literature 
on this topic was recorded in table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Relevant literature on the importance of the human aspect for information 
security management 
The importance of the human aspect for information security management 
Author(s) & year Findings 
D'Arcy, Herath, & 
Shoss (2014) 
InfoSec managers should consider human aspects of InfoSec. 
 Trček, Trobec, 
Pavešić & Tasič 
(2007) 
The most important factor behind ensuring InfoSec is humans, because 
in every InfoSec system, there is complex interplay between humans 
and technology. 
Chang, Wang & 
Shen (2010) 
In addition to technical security threats, there are attacks such as social 
engineering, which targets the human element.  
Yeniman et al. 
(2011) 
The most common security vulnerability has been human carelessness; 
the human factor therefore remains the weakest link in InfoSec. 
Rhee, Ryu & Kim 
(2012) 
Effective InfoSec management must consider human aspects along 
with technological dimensions. 
Vance, Lowry & 
Eggett (2013) 
Malicious insiders possessing a higher level of knowledge, resources 
and data access are a big threat to InfoSec as compared to outsiders. 
Jaeger (2013) 
The major causes of data breaches are employees’ errors, rather than 
hackers. 
Dagada & Eloff 
(2013)  
Technical security controls alone are not effective protection 
mechanisms. There is a need for policies, user awareness and 
education as administrative security defences to target the human 
element, which is prone to attacks. 
 
From table 4.4, it is clear that the human element has accounted for InfoSec policy violations 
and is therefore a significant factor to address in order to improve policy compliance.  The 
insider threat is even more dangerous than external threats, as an insider may easily misuse 
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the skills and knowledge gained through legitimate work duties for illegitimate gain (Willison 
& Siponen, 2009). The countermeasures used for human-based vulnerabilities in business 
organisations is the user InfoSec awareness programme as well as the user induction 
programme. 
 
The last concept noted to be of significance from the literature regarding policy compliance 
was the InfoSec policy itself, and its clarity as discussed in the next section. 
 
4.2.1.5. Information security policy clarity (the policy itself) 
 
Table 4.5: Relevant literature on information security policy clarity (the policy itself) 
Information security policy clarity 
Author(s) & year Findings 
Kolkowska & Dhillon, 
(2013) 
InfoSec policy description was inconsistent due to the conflict in 
functional rules and where several security objectives might have 
been contradicting one another. 
Gerber et al. (2001) 
 
Once the InfoSec requirements have been determined and 
documented, the adequate security controls are then 
implemented. One of the most common security controls is the 
InfoSec policy document. 
More attention should be paid to securing information assets and 
not only infrastructure. 
Höne & Eloff (2002) 
These policies also define the rights and responsibilities of 
information resource users by helping the users understand what 
is deemed acceptable and responsible behaviour in handling 
organisational data and information resources to ensure the safe 
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and secure handling of information in performing their 
organisational duties and responsibility. 
Bandara, Lupu & Russo 
(2003) 
They discuss a method for transforming policy and system 
behaviour specifications into a formal notation that is based on 
event calculus. 
They argue against formal logic based systems. Logic-based 
languages have proved attractive for the specification of a 
security policy, as they have a well-understood formalism. 
However, they can be difficult to use and are not always directly 
translatable into efficient implementation. 
Danchev (2003) 
The author defines a security policy as a plan outlining a 
company’s critical assets and how they can and must be 
protected. An InfoSec policy is necessary because it serves as 
the first measure in reducing unacceptable use of the ICT 
resources in an organisation. The policy should be “precise yet 
enforceable”. 
Some elements of a good and well-developed security policy: 
 Addresses the handling of sensitive information 
 Details how the personal user ID and password(s) 
should be properly maintained 
 States how employees should respond to a potential 
security incident or suspected security breach or 
intrusion 
 Details how to securely use ICT resources, including 
computers and internet connections 
 Indicates how to use the organisation’s corporate e-
mail system. 
Rees et al. (2003) They point out the problem of keeping InfoSec policies consistent. 
Von Solms & Von 
Solms (2004) 
The policy should act as the point of departure for employees with 
respect to all InfoSec issues, and in so doing, it becomes the 
‘heart and basis’ of successful security management.  
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D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss 
(2014) 
 
InfoSec policies have a significant impact on the security of 
information systems and successful business operations. 
Sohr, Drouineaud & 
Ahn (2005) 
They focus on security policies for access control in clinical 
information systems. They report that these policies are highly 
dynamic because of their area of application. They define formal 
specifications of dynamic security policies for clinical information 
systems. They chose first-order linear temporal logic (LTL) as 
their formalism of choice and one of their reasons is that it has 
been intensively studied in the literature. They use first-order LTL 
to specify role-based access control security policies. 
Information Security 
Policy: A development 
guide for large and 
small companies (2006) 
The lack of InfoSec policy clarity is noted as a policy-development 
problem. 
 
Gelbstein (2006) 
The organisation has to ensure that the InfoSec policy is available 
to its intended users, easy to use, updated and kept current.  
Saleh et al. (2007) 
Employees should have little excuse for not being able to apply 
defined security practices in accordance with the established 
policy. 
Boehmer (2008) 
 
The ISO/IEC27001 document provides the mandatory 
requirements for an information security management system. It 
mandates for the InfoSec policy to govern the day-to-day 
operations of ICT. It uses ISO/IEC27002 to indicate suitable 
controls in a security management system. 
The ISO/IEC27002 is an InfoSec standard published by the 
International Organization for Standardization. 
Parkin, Van Moorsel & 
Coles (2009) 
They developed an InfoSec ontology to better understand the 
human-behavioural factors within the InfoSec space. They argue 
that their model can be used to represent the knowledge of 
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insider threats and provide details on limiting malicious insider 
activity. 
The authors found that it was possible for organisations to 
consolidate consideration for human factors with compliance with 
security standards. 
Doherty, Anastasakis & 
Fulford (2009) 
The most important role of the InfoSec policy is to make plain the 
rights and responsibilities of users such that these are made clear 
and understood by the users. 
This is to ensure that there is a uniform and consistent 
institutional view of InfoSec, thereby further emphasising the need 
to make InfoSec policies explicit, leading to the need to formalise 
them. 
Knapp, Morris, Marshall 
& Byrd (2009) 
Organisations are more dependent on the reliability of their 
information systems in order to ensure the credibility of their 
information and decisions. Therefore, there is a need to define the 
rules that govern InfoSec measures; these rules are contained in 
InfoSec policies. 
Andress (2014) 
The authors highlight an important aspect of InfoSec policies, 
namely that they should be kept current by means of periodic 
reviews and updates to ensure that they are relevant and applied 
by their intended users. 
Whitman & Mattord 
(2012) 
InfoSec focuses on preserving the critical characteristics of 
information, such as availability, accuracy, authenticity, 
confidentiality and integrity. 
They describe the notion of a good InfoSec policy in that it should 
encapsulate the responsibilities of individuals, denote what is 
authorised and unauthorised system use and enable individuals 
to report suspected or identified threats (whistle blowing); it 
should define punishment means for policy violations and ways to 
update the policy to keep up with the constantly changing IT 
environment. 
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InfoSec policy clarity as a policy compliance barrier could have a ripple effect on all the other 
barriers, regardless of how well they have been addressed. Therefore, there should be more 
focus on increasing policy clarity and reducing ambiguity.  
 
4.2.2. Systematic literature review conclusion 
The barriers to InfoSec policy clarity can be addressed as noted in table 4.6: 
Table 4.6: Possible solutions to InfoSec policy compliance barriers 
Compliance barrier Possible solution 
The lack of management support Increase active participation in and support of InfoSec 
initiatives. 
Organisational culture 
Increase InfoSec policy awareness training. 
Lack of InfoSec policy awareness 
and training Initiate awareness and training initiatives. 
Human aspects of InfoSec policy 
management Increase InfoSec policy awareness training. 
InfoSec policy clarity 
Clarify policy statements. 
Table 4.6 presented the possible solutions to the compliance barriers. However, with 
regards to the policy clarity, irrespective of how much top-management commitment or 
participation is provided to InfoSec management, an unclear policy could just as well lead 
the same top management to non-compliance by misinterpretation.  
The same holds for changing the organisational culture and increasing InfoSec policy 
awareness and training. The presence of ambiguity in the InfoSec policy document could 
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render these efforts futile. Therefore, it was deemed essential to investigate the problem of 
ambiguity in order to gain a better understanding and subsequently address the problem. 
The next section presents the results of the content analysis process.  
 
4.3. Content analysis results 
For the purpose of the content analysis, an online search was conducted for InfoSec policies 
of higher education institutions, globally. Two institutions were randomly sampled from the 
available population and their InfoSec policies were used as the data sample. Each of the 
sampled institutions had a single policy with multiple sections, as opposed to each section 
of the InfoSec policy contained in a separate document. 
 
The reviewed InfoSec policies included a random sample of the online InfoSec policy 
documents from higher education institutions collected online, named OP1-OP2 for the 
confidentiality and anonymity of the institutions; and a further purposive sample of 10 
InfoSec related policies from a single higher education institution, the policies were named 
P1-P10.  The initial content analysis process is detailed in the next section. 
 
4.3.1. Initial Content analysis 
 
The randomly sampled InfoSec policy documents, together with the purposive sample were 
used for the initial analysis. The initial analysis was done to derive, test and establish themes 
or categories to be applied as codes on the chosen purposive sample of data. An emergent 
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coding process was followed to develop themes from the statements and phrases in the 
reviewed policy documents. 
 
The emerging themes were documented as thematic codes as follows: 
 Structural/ Semantic/ Lexical Ambiguity (SeLA): Grammatically unclear and 
semantically ambiguous statements. The statement is broad and could be abused to 
refer to unintended outliers. 
 Vague or Implicit Descriptions (VID): Implicit statement. The content is alluded to but 
not explicitly mentioned. Assumed user background knowledge. The statement is 
vague and lacks clarity of detail. 
 Omissions and null Pointers (ONP): The content referred to is not available or 
accessible. The statement refers to an item that is not at the said location. 
 Double Negative (DN): The Statement uses a double negative to infer a positive 
meaning. This could potentially be confusing. The user is told what not to do. They 
first have to interpret the statement to its positive version to determine what to do. 
The statement is phrased using negative antonyms of the intended meaning with a 
negative connotation. 
 Contextual (Con): Contextual misplacement. The statement is placed in the wrong 
section of the document. Such practice may make it hard to locate it. The statement 
is placed with unrelated statements within the document. 
 
The data were reviewed several times to come up with mutually exclusive themes to 
categorise the data. Each identified ambiguous phrase was categorised into the theme that 
best describes the phrase’s characteristics that make it ambiguous. During the iterations of 
the emergent coding process, some phrases were discarded after consultation and 
discussion with the research supervisors; i.e. those phrases were initially thought to have 
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been unclear, but were deemed subjective given reasonable doubt. Table 4.7 reflects the 
subjective phrases from the reviewed policies. 
Table 4.7: Subjective policy statements 
Document 
name 
Statement Problem 
Researcher 
comments 
OP1 
 
8.11: “Your obligation to 
protect sensitive 
information continues 
after you leave the 
University”  
Ambiguous. 
Does this only include 
university-sensitive 
information or any 
sensitive information? 
Upon analyses, this 
was noted to be 
subjective, as it is easy 
to assume that the 
statement refers to 
sensitive information 
acquired as a user of 
the institution’s 
systems. 
13: “If you are performing 
work in an office that 
handles information 
subject to specific security 
regulations, you will be 
required to acknowledge 
that you have read, 
understand and agree to 
comply with the terms of 
this policy annually” 
Confusing. The policy 
should be 
acknowledged by all 
who use ICT 
systems, not only 
those dealing with 
information subject to 
security regulations. 
The researcher of the 
current study seemed 
to be questioning the 
institution’s policy 
scope. 
OP2 
3.10.3.1. “The IT security 
manager should be 
familiar with simple 
routines for collecting 
evidence”  
This section has only 
one statement. 
 
This is not a real 
problem. 
Vague. What 
constitutes simple 
routines and what 
evidence would they 
be collecting. 
Inconsistent. 
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The remaining phrases after the subjective ones were removed were categorised into their 
most suitable thematic codes. The occurrences of the themes as observed in the reviewed 
InfoSec policies were documented in Table 4.8.  
Table 4.8: Thematic grouping of policy problems to develop themes 
Semantic/Lexical ambiguity 
Document 
name 
Statement Problem 
P1 
 
5.6. “Users will not collect, 
maintain, use or disclose personal 
information for personal or illegal 
purposes”  
It is confusing that personal information 
should not be used for personal purposes. 
Simply, the user should read the statement 
and interpret it relative to the definition of 
personal information provided. In addition, it 
is not clear if one should not use one’s own 
personal information as well or only that of 
others.  
P6 
7.4. “All communication and/or 
communication related information 
collected through interception and 
/or monitoring will be destroyed 
within four years from the date 
upon which it wa/s collected” 
Says only “within four years”; does not give 
the minimum period for which the 
information will be kept. Therefore, the 
period range could be anything from a day 
to four years. 
  
 
Vague/Implicit description 
OP1 
8. “This includes creating difficult-
to-guess computer passwords”  
What do they mean by “difficult-to-guess”? 
The policy should define password 
requirements for its complexity, length and 
strength. 
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OP1 
9. “You must destroy or render 
unusable any confidential or highly 
confidential information contained 
in any physical document”  
The document does not say how to destroy 
or render unusable (assumes prior 
knowledge). 
 
P1 
 
8.2. “Unisa will, as far as 
reasonably possible, provide 
employees with the necessary 
tools and guidelines to provide 
basic online privacy features such 
as tools to detect and destroy 
spyware located on employees’ 
work stations”  
How are these provided? 
 
P7 
  
  
5.6. “Heads of operational units are 
responsible for: informing the 
students of this Policy and taking 
appropriate action when students 
do not adhere to the guidelines for 
acceptable use”  
What are the operational units? The role is 
vague. 
P7 
16.2.4. “Email messages should be 
kept brief and should be 
formulated appropriately”  
 
What do they mean by “brief”? Up to how 
many words? Moreover, what is appropriate 
formulation of an e-mail? Do the users 
know? 
P3 
 8.1.4. “A user must ensure that a 
mobile device is reasonably 
secured when on and off the 
campus”  
What exactly is meant by “reasonably 
secured”? 
 
P5 
10. “Proper internal control is to be 
maintained over all ICT assets, at 
all times. Proper ICT asset 
management – from requisition to 
disposal – ensures a much greater 
likelihood that the university will 
continue to meet customer 
What constitutes “proper internal control”? 
   
  
 
 
 
 
M.P. Buthelezi: 47361921  
  
 
 
 
101 
requirements into the indefinite 
future by planning in an orderly 
fashion and mandating consistency 
throughout the university”  
P5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.1. “Access rights to secure 
areas must be regularly reviewed 
and updated”  
How often or regular is “regularly”? 
13.2. “a) … Records must be kept, 
for a reasonable period, of all 
network-based communication with 
both internal and external parties”  
How long is “a reasonable period”? 
13.5. “All electronic information 
must be backed up onto secure 
storage media on a regular basis, 
for the purposes of disaster 
recovery and business continuity”  
How often or regular is “on a regular basis”? 
How frequent would that be? 
P2 
15.1. “Employees should connect 
their computers on the university’s 
network on a regular basis to 
ensure that virus protection, 
software versions and other 
security patches are updated”  
How often is “on a regular basis”? 
A minimum period should be recommended. 
OP2 
 
 
 
 
3.6.1.9. “All external doors and 
windows must be closed and 
locked at the end of the work day”  
What about the internal office doors? 
3.10.3.1. “The IT security manager 
should be familiar with simple 
routines for collecting evidence”  
Vague. What constitutes “simple routines” 
and what evidence would they be 
collecting? 
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Omission/Null pointer 
 
P6 
 
5.8 “On application by a privacy 
subject, Unisa will disclose: 
5.8.1. private information the 
institution collected from the 
privacy subject; 
5.8.2. the purpose the information 
was collected for; 
5.8.3 how the information was 
used; and  
5.8.4. how the information was 
disclosed, if at all”  
There is no indication of disclosing how the 
information was stored. Storage is a crucial 
aspect of personal information in order to 
ensure privacy and security; the storage of 
personal information has to be appropriate 
for its classification. Are there any minimum 
requirements in terms of encryption or 
protection of personal information in 
storage? 
 
Sections 7.1.3 and 7.2 are non-
existent.  
6.1.3 refers to paragraph 7.2, which is not in 
the document. 
6.2. and 6.3 refer to paragraph 7.1.3, which 
does not exist. 
Paragraph 7 has no sub-sections. 
P2 
Find document “Policy on the 
Management of Property, Plant 
and Equipment”  
Document not listed with IT policies on 
intranet. 
P3 
9.1.5.b) “Personally owned mobile 
devices connecting to the network 
must meet the minimum security 
standards prescribed by the 
Department: ICT”  
What are these minimum standards and 
where are they documented/accessible? 
P8 
7.3. “Academic messages must 
adhere to the basic guidelines”  
 Where are the basic guidelines 
documented? Where are they located? 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
M.P. Buthelezi: 47361921  
  
 
 
 
103 
Double negative 
P2 
8.2. “No item may be disposed of 
without the explicit approval of the 
ICT Disposal Committee”  
 The word “item” is not defined in the policy. 
Does it refer to ICT assets? 
P5 
8. “… It is unacceptable for anyone 
to use information resources to 
violate any law or Unisa policy or 
perform unethical academic or 
business acts”  
The statement could be stated to indicate 
that users should not use the resources to 
violate laws or Unisa policy, instead of 
saying it is unacceptable. What do they 
mean by “unacceptable”? 
 
The policy document should state the 
recommended actions and not merely the 
attitude towards the undesired actions.  
What actions is the statement 
recommending? 
OP1 
 
Page 15: “computers should be 
configured to time out after no 
more than 20 minutes of inactivity”  
Vague- double negative.  
 
Contextual 
OP1 
Section 8: physical security 
requirements listed with ICT 
security requirements 
Physical security requirements listed with 
ICT security requirements. 
While reviewing the policy documents to derive themes, some of the ambiguous words and 
phrases in Table 4.8, were noted to require simple one-step solutions as discussed in the 
next section.  
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4.3.1.1. Ambiguities that could be resolved in one step 
The following list of ambiguous words requires a definition of what they are, in order to 
resolve their ambiguity: 
1. Sensitive information 
2. Personal information 
3. Personal or illegal purposes 
4. No item may be disposed of without …  
5. Minimum security standards 
6. Academic messages must adhere to the basic guidelines 
7. Unacceptable 
8. Sensitive information 
9. Critical characteristics of information 
10.  Critical assets 
The previous list of ambiguous words, once given a definition within the InfoSec policy 
document, their intended meaning ought to become evident and clear to the policy users. 
The policy writers should ask the question, “how” should this process be executed? Then 
they would be able to provide clarity on the following ambiguous phrases noted in the 
policies: 
1. Simple routines for collecting evidence 
2. Difficult-to-guess computer passwords 
3. Destroy or render unusable 
4. As far as reasonably possible 
5. Taking appropriate action 
6. Kept brief 
7. Formulated appropriately 
8. Reasonably secured 
   
  
 
 
 
 
M.P. Buthelezi: 47361921  
  
 
 
 
105 
9. Planning in an orderly fashion 
10. Proper internal control 
11. Mandating consistency 
12. Simple routines for collecting evidence 
13. Private information 
14. Safe and secure handling of information 
15. Kept current 
16. Properly maintained 
 
With the above list of phrases, their related process should be clarified for their meaning to 
be clear. In the next list of ambiguous phrases, the time period or range should be stated in 
order to clarify the meaning of the words and reduce their ambiguity. The ambiguous 
phrases requiring a period range are: 
1. A reasonable period 
2. Must be backed up onto secure storage media on a regular basis 
3. Regularly reviewed and updated 
4. Employees should connect their computers on the university’s network on a regular 
basis 
5. No more than 20 minutes 
6. Periodic reviews 
 
Once the time period is stipulated, the meaning of the phrases should become clear to the 
policy users. The next list presents ambiguous phrases noted in the reviewed policies, where 
the words indicate assumed shared meaning or an implicit common understanding between 
the policy users and the policy writers: 
1. Precise yet enforceable 
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2. Consistent 
3. Easy to use 
4. Have little excuse 
5. Effective 
6. Effectiveness 
7. Effective security policies 
8. Visibility 
9. Awareness 
10. Understanding 
11. Properly educating staff 
12. Higher levels 
13. Behaviour for compliance 
14. A nuisance 
15. Compliance 
16. Employee attitude 
17. Human aspects 
18. Social engineering 
19. Malicious insiders 
20. Employees’ errors 
21. User awareness and education 
22. Administrative security defences 
 
Subsequent to the initial content analysis where themes were derived a secondary content 
analysis was performed as noted next. 
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For the secondary content analysis, AtlasTi software was used for a further analysis of the 
purposeful sample of the collected data, P1-P10. As a recap, the data were collected in the 
form of ICT policy documents. The documents were collected from a higher education 
institution in South Africa as a convenient sample. This particular institution was used, as it 
has ten different policies related to ICT. In general, other institutions have one InfoSec policy 
with sub-sections addressing other ICT aspects. AtlasTi qualitative data analysis software 
was used to generate the most frequently occurring words as observed across all ten policy 
documents. The words are documented in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Top ten most occurring words by combined totals (generated by 
researcher on AtlasTi) 
 
Only the sampled InfoSec policies from the chosen higher education institution were 
reviewed using the AtlasTi qualitative data analysis software. Using AtlasTi, for the 
secondary content analysis process, the ambiguity themes from the initial manual content 
256
218
199
168 167 159
137
111 108 101
Top ten most occuring words
Total count
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analysis were used as themes for coding the data. Seventeen ambiguous statements were 
identified in the reviewed InfoSec policies. The results of this process are depicted 
diagrammatically (semantic layout) in Table 4.9. 
 
 
Table 4.9: List of ambiguous words as resulting from the AtlasTi software qualitative 
analysis 
 
Network view: Final semantic layout of ambiguous words 
Created by: Super 2017-02-17 T22:36:12 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Nodes count: 18 
Codes (1):  
Ambiguous words {17-0} 
Quotations [pdf] (17):  
1:8 the necessary tools and guidelines... (5:232-5:267) 
1:9 provide basic online privacy… (5:272-5:309) 
1:10 disclose personal information ... (3:1618-3:1683) 
2:2 item (3:1214-3:1218) 
3:2 reasonably secured (5:439-5:456) 
3:4 minimum security standards (5:2281-5:2309) 
5:3 Proper ICT asset management (4:2777-4:2805) 
5:4 Proper internal control (4:2698-4:2720) 
5:6 regularly reviewed (5:1373-5:1390) 
5:7 Logging of external communication... (8:1166-8:1325) 
5:8 reasonable period (8:1230-8:1246) 
5:10 on a regular basis (9:1558-9:1577) 
5:12 must be kept to a minimum (11:738-11:762) 
6:3 will be destroyed within four ... (7:237-7:271) 
7:2 taking appropriate action (4:1931-4:1956) 
7:4 kept brief (10:1359-10:1368) 
8:2 basic guidelines (4:1719-4:1734) 
 
The AtlasTi software was used to code the ambiguous phrases. Table 4.9 presents the list 
of identified words. The numbers in brackets indicate the location of the words in their 
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respective documents. For example, the first ambiguous word or quotation was identified in 
Document P5 from letter number 232 to letter number 267 in the document, as indicated by 
the number (5:232–5:267). There were 18 nodes in total, as this included the heading node 
“Ambiguous words”. 
 
     
 
 
 
 
M.P. Buthelezi: 47361921  
  
 
 
 
110 
The results of this process were also depicted diagrammatically in Figure 4.2 in the form of an AtlasTi semantic layout diagram. 
 
Figure 4.2: AtlasTi: Semantic layout of ambiguous words (generated by researcher on AtlasTi) 
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The semantic layout in Figure 4.2 reflects the words identified as ambiguous in the ten 
reviewed policy documents, P1-P10. The words are noted in their context for clarity and 
ease of reference. The identified ambiguous statements from the rest of the sample were 
grouped into their respective ambiguity themes. The themes were derived from the initial 
manual content analysis. The resulting categorised ambiguous phrases are presented in 
Table 4.10, with the ambiguous key-words and key-phrases indicated in bold text formatting. 
 
Table 4.10: Thematically categorised ambiguous words and phrases / Results of the 
document review indicating ambiguous statements 
Theme/ 
Code 
Content analysis results 
Ambiguous statement Problem description Policy 
D
N
 &
V
ID
 
“No item may be disposed of 
without the explicit approval of the 
ICT Disposal Committee.” 
The word “item” is not defined in the 
policy. Does it refer to ICT assets? 
The statement is also phrased with a 
double negative. 
P2  
V
ID
 
“A user must ensure that a mobile 
device is reasonably secured 
when on and off the campus.” 
How does one ensure that a mobile 
device is “reasonably” secured? The 
policy did not provide any process 
steps or suggestions. 
P3 
“The Institution will, as for as 
reasonably possible, provide 
employees with the necessary 
tools and guidelines to provide 
basic online privacy features 
such as tools to detect and destroy 
spyware located on employees’ 
work stations.” 
The policy document does not define 
these tools and guidelines. How does 
the institution determine what 
constitutes “necessary” tools and 
guidelines? 
The document does not define what 
these basic features are. 
P1 
Proper ICT asset management – 
from requisition to disposal – 
ensures a much greater likelihood 
that the university will continue to 
meet customer requirements into 
the indefinite future by planning in 
an orderly fashion and mandating 
consistency throughout the 
university.” 
What constitutes “proper ICT asset 
management”? 
P2 
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“Proper internal control is to be 
maintained over all ICT assets, at 
all times.” 
What constitutes “proper internal 
control”? 
P2 
“… Access rights to secure areas 
must be regularly reviewed and 
updated.” 
How often or regular is “regularly”? P3 
“The following logging must be 
implemented: 
 
a) Logging of external 
communications” 
Does this statement apply to all or only 
some external communications? If 
some, which ones? 
P6 
“… Records must be kept, for a 
reasonable period, of all network-
based communication with both 
internal and external parties.” 
How long is a “reasonable” period? P5 
All electronic information must be 
backed up onto secure storage 
media on a regular basis, for the 
purposes of disaster recovery and 
business continuity.” 
How often or regular is “on a regular 
basis”? How frequent would that be? 
P5 
V
ID
 
 
… The number of privileged 
accounts must be kept to a 
minimum, and only provided to 
those employees whose job duties 
require it …” 
A minimum of how many? Based on 
what? What if 1 000 employees’ job 
duties require it? 
P5 
“Heads of operational units are 
responsible for: informing the 
students of this Policy and taking 
appropriate action when students 
do not adhere to the guidelines for 
acceptable use.” 
What constitutes “appropriate” action? P7 
“Email messages should be kept 
brief and should be formulated 
appropriately.” 
What do they mean by “brief”? Up to 
how many words? Moreover, what is 
appropriate formulation of an e-mail? 
Do the users know? The document did 
not provide guidelines. 
P8 
S
e
L
A
 
 
“Users will not collect, maintain, 
use or disclose personal 
information for personal or illegal 
purposes.” 
 
The users should read the statement 
and interpret it relative to the definition 
of personal information provided. In 
addition, it is not clear if one should not 
P1 
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use one’s own personal information as 
well, or only that of others. 
“All communication and/or 
communication related information 
collected through interception 
and/or monitoring will be 
destroyed within four years from 
the date upon which it was 
collected.” 
The phrase “within four years” does 
not give the minimum period for which 
the information will be kept. Therefore, 
the period range could be anything 
from a day to four years. 
P6 
O
N
P
 
 
“Personally owned mobile devices 
connecting to the network must 
meet the minimum security 
standards prescribed by the 
Department: ICT.” 
These minimum standards were not 
documented anywhere in the ICT 
policies. 
What are these minimum standards 
and where are they 
documented/accessible? 
P3 
“Academic messages must adhere 
to the basic guidelines.” 
Where are the basic guidelines 
documented? Where are they located? 
They were not noted in the reviewed 
InfoSec Policy and its sub-policies. 
P8 
 
The content analysis results in Table 4.10 were further presented in a pie chart, in order to 
highlight the distribution and prevalence of each ambiguity theme. The pie chart is presented 
in Figure 4.3. The graph indicates that the CON theme had no occurrences in the reviewed 
documents, as noted in Figure 4.3, with 0%. There was a 6% occurrence of the DN theme. 
There was therefore a low significance of ambiguities occurring because of double 
negatively phrased statements.  
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Figure 4.3: Thematic occurrences of ambiguous phrases / Distribution of the problem 
categories 
 
Both the ONP and the SeLA themes had minimal occurrences at 12% of the ambiguities 
each, together accounting for a mere 24% of all occurring ambiguities. The VID theme, on 
the other hand, had the most occurrences, accounting for 70% of all identified ambiguities.  
 
The data were further analysed in AtlasTi for co-occurrences. A co-occurrence indicates 
associations between concepts. In the case where codes are co-occurring, it means that 
they are coding the same quotation or they are coding quotations that are touching each 
other in some manner per table 4.11, e.g. overlapping. 
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Table 4.11: Co-occurrences of ambiguity 
 
The co-occurrence table, table 4.11, indicates the intensity of the co-occurrences measured 
by the C-coefficient, whose values range between 0 and 1. The “Ambiguous words”, variable 
co-occurs with the omission variable. This is due to the fact that omissions are categorised 
as a form of ambiguity, as it is not clear where the user should refer to for that particular 
statement. “Ambiguous words” also co-occur with semantic ambiguity and vague implicit 
descriptions, as it is a subset of these types of ambiguities. Because they have the language 
theme in common. As noted in table 4.11, the Contextual(CON) theme was initially called St 
(structural) and later changed to CON. 
 
From the co-occurrences, it was noted that there were commonly occurring sub-themes 
within the SeLA, DN and VID themes, such as: 
 Language: The use of unclear language by the policy writers; 
 Knowledge: assumed background knowledge of the policy user by the policy writers; 
the knowledge type could be 
o Educational knowledge; 
o InfoSec awareness knowledge; 
o Experience/experiential knowledge;  
 Personal experience in technology use; 
 Organisational culture and practices; 
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Similarly, there were commonly occurring sub-themes between the ONP and Con themes 
such as: 
 Structure: the manner in which the InfoSec policy is laid out. 
 Relation:  how the different sections and aspects of the policy relate to and reference 
each other. 
 
For this reason, the SeLA, DN and VID themes were grouped into the Language sub-theme; 
while the ONP and Con themes were grouped into the Structure theme. These groupings 
were conducted on the content analysis results of the data from the purposive sample. I.e. 
P1-P10. From this analysis, the population distribution was represented in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Population distribution of the “language” and “structure” themes 
 
Language
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12%
Language and Structure theme occurrences
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Figure 4.4 reflects the occurrence of the language theme and the structure theme relative 
to each other. The most prevalent theme was the language theme at 88 % of the ambiguities. 
The structure theme accounted for only 12% of the ambiguity occurrence. 
 
Similarly, “omissions” co-occurs with structural ambiguity because it is a subset thereof. 
Omissions indicate the missing document references and the structural category highlights 
that either statements or documents referred to are not provided or they do not exist. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
The VID category, having the most number of statements, suggests that most of the policy 
statements in the reviewed policies were ambiguous due to their implicit nature. The implicit 
documentation of the InfoSec policies suggests the possibility of assumed user background 
knowledge by the policy writers, having made assumptions about the reader’s prior 
contextual InfoSec knowledge or experience. Clearer policy statements with simpler 
structure could increase compliance. 
 
The fourth research objective of defining how InfoSec policy ambiguity can be reduced in 
order to improve compliance and clarity, was addressed by means of the proposed solutions 
and framework in the next chapter, Chapter 5. The proposed solutions and framework are 
represented in the form of model building and application scenarios to test the proposed 
frameworks. 
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Chapter 5 
Proposed solution and Framework 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the research results and findings that emerged after 
applying the research methodology, and the analysis of the results. This chapter aims to 
shed some light on how the identified ambiguity problems could be addressed. An initial 
attempt at addressing the problems as identified by the study was a general review of the 
problem categories and what they had in common. They all lack clarity, in one way or 
another.  
 
Based on the category definitions and descriptions, a general solution is suggested per 
category and documented in Table 5.1. This chapter further proposes some possible 
solutions in order to address the problems identified in the research findings of the study.  
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
M.P. Buthelezi: 47361921  
  
 
 
 
119 
  
Table 5.1: General ambiguity solutions per category 
Theme SeLA VID ONP DN Con 
   
P
ro
p
o
s
e
d
 s
o
lu
ti
o
n
 Be more 
specific when 
compiling 
policy 
statements to 
increase 
clarity and 
reduce the 
SeLA category 
of ambiguity. 
Explicitly 
describe the 
actions that 
the users 
should 
perform to 
comply with 
the policy 
statements. 
Reduce the 
presence of 
implicit policy 
statements. 
Conduct a 
self-review 
of the policy 
statements 
before the 
final release 
or update. 
Rewrite the 
policy 
statements 
to reflect the 
correct 
location of 
other related 
documents 
or 
statements.  
Alternatively, 
remove the 
statement if 
the related 
documents 
are no 
longer 
applicable or 
no longer 
relevant. 
Phrase 
statements 
positively 
and avoid 
the double 
negative 
category of 
ambiguity. 
The policy 
statement 
should 
reflect a 
positive 
phrasing of 
what the 
users should 
do, and 
avoid 
introducing 
double 
negatives, 
unless it is 
the only way 
to get the 
message 
across. E.g.: 
Users should 
not leave 
their ICT 
equipment 
unattended 
when 
travelling.  
Move the 
statement to 
the correct 
section. 
Alternatively, 
remove the 
statement if 
it is no 
longer 
relevant. 
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In addition to the general category solutions in Table 5.1, it is recommended that in order to 
generally increase policy statement clarity, each policy statement should be clear with 
regard to the following questions and not leave it to the user’s discretion. The researcher 
synthesised a framework, in the form of a list of questions that the policy writers should ask, 
in order to facilitate that each policy statement has clearly addressed the questions of what 
is required from the user. The questions are depicted in Figure 5.1 and listed as follows: 
 Actor: Who should carry out the action or perform the activity? 
 Action: What is the action required of the user? What should the user do? 
 Process: How should the process steps be carried out? 
 Time: When should the action be carried out? When should the user act? 
 Duration: For how long should the user carry out the action? 
 Range: How much of the activity should the user do? What is the minimum or 
maximum? 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Framework of questions to probe in order to increase clarity and reduce 
ambiguity (synthesised by researcher) 
 
The questions posed in Figure 5.1 should help policy writers to clarify policy statements. 
This method of problem solving was borrowed from UML use case diagrams where the 
Actor
Who?
Action
What ?
Process
How?
Time 
When?
Duration
For how 
long?
Range
How much; 
minimum or 
maximum?
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system users, also referred to as actors, are depicted in their interactions with the system 
(Abdelaziz, El-Tahir & Osman, 2015; Sommerville, 2013). See Figure 5.2 for an example of 
a use case diagram. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: A use case diagram representing an ambiguous statement (synthesised 
by researcher) 
 
Figure 5.2 represents a sample ambiguous statement taken from policy P1, in the SeLA 
theme: “Users will not collect, maintain, use or disclose personal information for personal or 
illegal purposes.” 
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Use cases can help identify the different types of users and how they interact with the 
system. This aspect can assist policy writers to identify the different InfoSec actions required 
from the different system users, based on their interactions with the different systems. In 
Figure 5.2, the use case diagram indicates people or role players in the form for stick 
figurines labelled policy writer, policy reviewer, policy user, student and staff. In the oval, are 
the activities performed by the role players.  
 
It is often said that the best way to address any problem is to break it up into smaller sections, 
and that is what the researcher did to further provide category-specific ambiguity solutions. 
This strategy was derived from the concept of “divide and conquer” made popular by Frank 
Capra in his 1943 propaganda film “Why We Fight: Divide and Conquer” (Frank Capra, 1943, 
cited in Xifra & Girona, 2012). The Frank Capra film series was made in 1943 and centred 
on infiltrating and the conquering the enemy (Boddy, 2011; Xifra & Girona, 2012). The divide 
and conquer strategy is also used in economics, politics, history as well as in sociology, and 
is referred to as “divide and rule” (Boddy, 2011). 
 
There is an algorithm in computer science with the same name as the strategy, namely the 
divide and conquer (D&C) algorithm, which subscribes to the fundamental concepts of the 
D&C strategy (Dwyer, 1987). The D&C algorithm is applied by repeatedly breaking down a 
problem into smaller manageable chunks of the same or related type until the chunks are 
simple enough to be solved directly. The key strength of D&C is optimisation of resources. 
 
In light of the D&C strategy and algorithm, the identified ambiguity problem categories were 
then reviewed individually in order to provide some practical solutions per category, starting 
with the SeLA category. The following solutions put forward. 
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5.2. Structural, semantic and lexical ambiguity (SeLA) 
Ontologies (ontology-based interpretation of natural language) have been used in literature 
to address semantic ambiguity in natural language by representing the knowledge as 
concepts of the domain under review (Jurisica, Mylopoulos & Yu, 1999; Yarowsky, 1994).  
 
Providing the details of the domain context for the area under discussion, has been 
suggested to resolve structural ambiguity. Automation has also been used for lexical 
ambiguity resolution. In the field of computational linguistics, statistical decision procedures 
are used for lexical ambiguity resolution by use of algorithms that exploit the syntactic 
patterns and generate a disambiguation in the target context (Yarowsky, 1994). The use of 
ontologies and automation software would require technical skills from policy users. 
 
The ambiguity problem has is an age-old problem. Bunt (1984:131) reports that “[t]o some 
extent this ‘ambiguity explosion problem’ is an artefact of the usual method of formal 
semantic analysis”. He suggests the use of formal methods for dealing with ambiguity (Bunt, 
1984). 
 
As per the literature on formal methods, the FOL language was found to be among the least 
technical and closest to natural language (Hinchey, Bowen & Rouff, 2006). Do Amaral, 
Bazilio, Da Silva, Rademaker & Haeusler (2006) recommend the use of formalisation to 
extract the semantics of the intended action statements from security policies. This was also 
the intended results for this research, using a formalism that is user-friendly and enables 
comprehensibility and ease of implementation by the users. 
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Therefore, the researcher applied formal methods in the form of first-order logic to a sample 
ambiguous statement from the SeLA category derived from the data-analysis phase of the 
research process. FOL was applied to the statement as an example, and to test the 
usefulness of FOL in addressing the identified ambiguity: 
 
A statement taken from policy P1, in the SeLA theme specifies: “Users will not collect, 
maintain, use or disclose personal information for personal or illegal purposes.” 
Applying FOL, defining the predicates, followed by the sentence give: 
 
Predicates:  
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 (𝑥 ): 𝑥  is a user. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑦): 𝑦  is someone’s personal info. 
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥  collects info  . 
Maintain(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥  maintains info  . 
Use(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥  uses info  . 
Disclose(𝑥, 𝑦) : 𝑥  discloses info  . 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑢𝑠𝑒 (𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥  uses 𝑦  for personal purposes. 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑢𝑠𝑒(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑥  uses 𝑦  for illegal purposes. 
 
FOL representation: 
 (∀𝑥)(∀𝑦)( 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 (𝑥)  ∧  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑦) → ¬   ((𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦)  ∨  Maintain(𝑥, 𝑦) ∨
 Use(𝑥, 𝑦) ∨ Disclose(𝑥, 𝑦))  ∧  ( 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑢𝑠𝑒 (𝑥, 𝑦)  ∨   𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑢𝑠𝑒(𝑥, 𝑦)) )    [1] 
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The process of translating a natural language statement to FOL is usually challenging, 
therefore a first step could be to first rewriting the natural language statement into a different 
format as follows: 
 
Reformulation of natural language statement: 
 
For all users, if there are personal information then such information should not be used for 
non-work purposes. 
 
As before the predicates evident in the above reformulation are defined first: 
 
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑥): 𝑥  is a user. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑦): 𝑦  is personal info. 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦): User 𝑥  takes an action on info 𝑦. The relevant actions are defined below. 
𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘_𝑢𝑠𝑒 (𝑥, 𝑦) : User 𝑥  uses info 𝑦  for non-work purposes. 
 
Where 
Action ::= Collect | Maintain | Use | Disclose 
  Non_work_use::= Personal_use | Illegal_use 
  
FOL formulation of the alternative natural language statement: 
 
(∀𝑥) (𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑥) → ((∃𝑦) (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜(𝑦) → ¬ ( 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧  𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘_𝑢𝑠𝑒(𝑥, 𝑦))))) [2] 
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The question arises which of the two formulae are to be preferred. It turns out formula [1] is 
stronger than formula [2], as can readily be verified by a theorem prover, e.g. OTTER 
(McCune, 1994). On closer inspection, we note formula [1] makes a strong statement about 
all users (x) and all information (y). Hence, no user (not even a top-level manager) is allowed 
to perform the said action on any information for malicious purposes. In formula [2], however, 
the y becomes a function of x, since it is in the scope of x.  
 
So, depending on who the user is in the organisation, it is possible the user may be allowed 
to manipulate the information. This is not necessarily wrong or unwanted, so the decision as 
to which of formula [1] or [2] to prefer, depends on who may manipulate which kind of 
information according to (other) organisational policies. From the OTTER theorem prover, 
formula [1] states the prohibited actions, whereas formula [2] seems to suggest role-based 
access control. 
 
A decision tree can also be used to represent the natural language statement in order to 
add clarity to the FOL version of the policy statement to add clarity to the natural language 
statement. Subsequently, a decision tree was used to represent the structure and decision 
path of the statement. See Figure 5.3. 
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Users
Collect
1
Maintain Use Disclose
Personal 
information
2 3
4
6
5
7
8
Illegal 
purposes
9
Personal 
purposes
10
 
Figure 5.3: A decision tree representing a SeLA ambiguous statement with ten 
branches/nodes (synthesised by researcher) 
 
In Figure 5.3 the decision tree represents the decision process for the user. Each node of 
the decision tree is numbered to reflect its sequence in the execution process. The decision 
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tree may be further simplified to reduce the number of nodes in the tree from ten nodes to 
three nodes, as demonstrated in Figure 5.4. 
 
Users
Action
1
Personal 
information
2
3
Prohibited 
purpose
 
Figure 5.4: A decision tree representing a SeLA ambiguous statement with three 
branches/nodes (synthesised by researcher) 
 
In order to avoid having to write ten FOL statements representing each node of Figure 5.3, 
and to represent it only once, the number of nodes in the decision tree were reduced. Firstly, 
all the actions were compressed together into a set of the elements: 
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Therefore, the decision tree in Figure 5.4 emerged as a result of the reduced number of 
nodes, with elements compressed into sets. From the decision tree in Figure 5.4, the 
corresponding FOL representation of the statement becomes: 
 
Therefore: The classified information should only be used for work-related purposes, as 
seen in the third representation of this statement, and essentially, the formalisation process 
has brought to light the fact that this statement was not only SeLA but also negatively 
phrased.  
 
The initial assessment had focused on double negatives as seen to cause ambiguity. 
However, the formalisation of the current statement has proved that negative phrasing of 
statements could also reduce statement ambiguity. Therefore, it is suggested by the 
researcher that the statement be phrased in a positive manner prior to being formalised. 
Thereafter, the positive paraphrased version of the policy statement would be: 
 
““Users should collect, maintain, use, or disclose organisational classified information for 
work-related purposes only.” 
Should the policy writers be non-technical users, any technical solutions would require them 
to acquire additional skills or learn a new technical language. Therefore, it accentuates the 
realisation that a simple type of solution would be practical and usable for the InfoSec policy 
owners and writers. Such a more simplistic solution is henceforth provided for each 
ambiguity problem category, starting with SeLA in Figure 5.5. Table 5.1 also provides an 
overview of the simpler solutions in the introduction of this chapter. 
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SeLA problem 
detected.
Use synonyms 
and descriptive 
words.
Define word 
and include 
word in glossary 
of terms.
Done.
Statement 
still 
unclear?
Yes
No
Figure 5.5: A general solution framework for solving SeLA problems (synthesised by 
researcher) 
Example problem resolutions: 
To test the solution provided in Figure 5.5, the following SeLA statement was used as a 
sample: 
“Users will not collect, maintain, use or disclose personal information for personal or 
illegal purposes.” 
Figure 5.6 shows the process of SeLA resolution being followed to address a sample SeLA 
category problem. Once the process is done, the resulting disambiguated policy statement 
became: 
“Users will not collect, maintain, use or disclose information classified as ‘personal 
information’ by the organisation, and obtained as part of their duties for non-work-related or 
illegal purposes.” 
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OR 
“Users will not collect, maintain, use or disclose organisational information obtained as part 
of their duties or classified as ‘personal information’ for non-work-related or illegal purposes.” 
 
SeLA problem 
detected:
 The word  "Personal" 
refers to more than 
one context.
Use synonyms and 
descriptive words:
Personal information. First 
context: Users will not 
disclose personal 
information.
Using descriptive words to 
replace the ambiguous word:  
Users will not disclose 
information classified as 
“personal information” by the 
organisation, and obtained 
as part of their duties.
Second context: for personal 
purposes. Using a synonym: 
non-work related purposes.
Define word and include 
word in glossary of terms:
Personal information: 
information identifiable to an 
individual or organisation. 
Information belonging to the 
organisation.
Personal purposes: 
purposes not related to work. 
Home or social use.
Done.
Statement 
still 
unclear?
Yes
No
 
Figure 5.6: SeLA general solution framework applied to a sample statement 
(synthesised by researcher) 
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Having formalised the statement and tested it in the sample solution, combining the results 
of the two processes produced the following disambiguated statement: 
“Users should collect, maintain, use or disclose organisational information obtained as part 
of their duties or classified as ‘personal information’, only for work-related purposes and not 
for non-work or illegal purposes.” 
The resulting statement after applying the steps in Figure 5.6 is rather long. The policy 
writers could also try using short policy statements for ease of reference by users. 
 
The next section provides the framework for the VID category of ambiguity. 
 
5.3. Vague/Implicit description (VID) 
VID problem 
detected.
Provide the 
process steps 
to be followed.
Done.
Statement 
refers to a 
process?
Yes
No
Expand or 
elaborate on 
description.
 
Figure 5.7: Framework for solving VID problems (synthesised by researcher) 
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A policy statement from the VID category of ambiguity themes, originally taken from policy 
P5 was used an example to test the proposed solution for the VID problem category. The 
following statement was used: 
“Records must be kept, for a reasonable period, of all network-based communication 
with both internal and external parties”. 
The policy writers should define what constitutes a reasonable period. For example, 
choosing “three years”, as an example period. Following the VID solution steps and using 
three years as the reasonable period, the following solution was devised: 
 
VID problem 
detected:
 How long is “a 
reasonable 
period”?
Provide the 
process steps 
to be followed.
Done.
Statement 
refers to a 
process?
Yes
No
Expand or 
elaborate on 
description:
Records of all 
network-based 
communication 
with both 
internal and 
external parties  
must be kept for 
a minimum 
period of at 
least three 
years.
 
Figure 5.8: VID general solution framework applied to a sample statement 
(synthesised by researcher) 
   
  
 
 
 
 
M.P. Buthelezi: 47361921  
  
 
 
 
134 
 
The revised policy statement would be:” Records of all network-based communication with 
both internal and external parties must be kept for at least three years.” 
 
The next section provides the solution framework for the ONP ambiguity theme.  
  
5.4. Omission/Null pointer (ONP) 
The framework for addressing the ONP type of ambiguity within InfoSec policy documents 
is presented in Figure 5.9. 
ONP problem 
detected.
Provide hyperlink to 
document & include 
storage address in 
footnote.
Done.
Null pointer 
statement refers 
to an applicable 
document?
Yes
No
Remove the 
null pointer 
statement.
Omission or 
Null pointer?
Null pointer
Omission
Add omitted 
statement.
Figure 5.9: Framework for solving ONP problems (synthesised by researcher) 
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In Figure 5.9, the framework for resolving ONP ambiguities is provided, but in order to see 
its usefulness, it was necessary to test it using a sample problem from the data analysis, per 
Figure 5.10. 
ONP problem detected:
P6 section 6.1.2 refers 
to paragraph 7.2 which 
does not appear in the 
document.
Provide hyperlink to 
document & include 
storage address in 
footnote.
Done.
Null pointer 
statement refers 
to an applicable 
document?
Yes
No
Remove the 
null pointer 
statement.
Omission or 
Null pointer?
Null pointer
Omission
Add omitted 
statement.
 
Figure 5.10: ONP general solution framework applied to a sample statement 
(synthesised by researcher) 
 
In the example used, section 6.1.2 of document P6 refers to paragraph 7.2, which does not 
exist in the document. Figure 5.10 provides an example of how this specific problem could 
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be resolved. The next ambiguity category to be addressed was the DN (Double Negative) 
category as noted in the next section. 
 
5.5. Double negative (DN) 
The framework in Figure 5.11 was developed in order to address the DN types of ambiguity. 
The arrows in the diagram indicate the steps to be followed in the process of resolving the 
ambiguity. 
DN problem 
detected.
Rephrase to a 
positive statement.
Done.
Statement 
reflects only the 
unacceptable 
action?
Yes
No
Rephrase to include 
the acceptable 
required action & 
reduce the number 
of negative words.
 
Figure 5.11: Framework for solving DN problems (synthesised by researcher) 
 
Figure 5.11 provides the suggested framework for DN ambiguity problems, and Figure 5.12 
provides the application of this framework to an already identified problem. In order to test 
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the framework for addressing DN types of ambiguity, a statement from policy P2, problem 
category, “double negative”, was used to test the proposed solution as follows: 
“No item may be disposed of without the explicit approval of the ICT disposal 
committee” 
DN problem detected:
“No item may be disposed 
of without the explicit 
approval of the ICT 
disposal committee”.
Rephrase to a 
positive 
statement.
Done.
Statement 
reflects only the 
unacceptable 
action?
Yes
No
Rephrase to include 
the acceptable 
required action & 
reduce the number 
of negative words.
 
Figure 5.12: DN general solution framework applied to a sample statement 
(synthesised by researcher) 
 
Instead of only listing what is unacceptable use as noted in Figure 5.12, the policy owners 
should first state what the acceptable use is. Therefore, then new statement would be: 
“The explicit approval of the ICT disposal committee should be obtained before any 
ICT asset may be disposed of.”   
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The newly phased policy statement is phrased in a positive manner for improved clarity of 
its intended message. The next framework addresses the Con category of ambiguity.  
 
5.6. Contextual (CON) 
The Con category of ambiguity relates to policy statements which are incorrectly placed 
within the InfoSec policy. These are the statements located in policy sections of an unrelated 
topic. The Con solution framework is presented in Figure 5.13.    
Con problem 
detected.
Remove statement 
from policy 
document.
Done.
Statement still 
relevant to policy 
document?
Yes
No
Move statement to 
relevant policy 
section.
 
Figure 5.13: Framework for solving CON problems (synthesised by researcher) 
 
In order to test the framework in Figure 5.13, one of the online policy documents was used 
because the Con theme had a 0% occurrence in the purposive sample. As noted in the initial 
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content analysis in Section 8 of policy document OP1, the document had physical security 
requirements listed with ICT security requirements. The testing of the Con solution 
framework is presented in Figure 5.14. 
 
Con problem 
detected:
OP1, Section 8: 
physical security 
requirements listed 
with ICT security 
requirements
Remove statement from 
policy document.
Done.
Statement still 
relevant to policy 
document?
Yes
No
Move statement to 
relevant policy section.
 
Figure 5.14: CON general solution framework applied to a sample statement 
(synthesised by researcher) 
 
With a policy statement located in an unrelated section as noted in Figure 5.14, the solution 
is to simply move it to the relevant policy section. The next section concludes this chapter 
with a chapter summary.  
 
5.7. Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the proposed solutions for reducing the identified ambiguity 
problems for each theme category as identified in the data analysis. The proposed solutions 
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were provided in the form of frameworks and those frameworks were tested in a scenario 
format as a proof of concept. Among the solutions proposed, statements were formalised in 
first-order logic. The next chapter provides the recommendations and concludes the study. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and recommendations 
6.1. Research overview 
Chapter one: Provided an introduction to the study, the problem background, the research 
aims and objectives, as well as the research questions.  
 
Chapter two: This chapter discussed the literature and related concepts underpinning the 
study in the form of a literature review.  
 
Chapter three: Presented the research design and methodology, detailing the steps 
followed and techniques used in executing the research process, including how the data 
was collected and analysed. 
 
Chapter four: Presented the research results and discussed the research findings in detail.  
 
Chapter five: Provided the proposed solutions in the form of modelled frameworks that 
could be used to reduce the occurrence of ambiguity within InfoSec policy documents.  
 
Chapter six: Concludes the study. The next section presents the summary of findings and 
how each research question was addressed. 
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6.2. Evaluation of the Study 
The conclusions were drawn from the research findings of the study as guided by the 
researcher to address the research objectives that were presented in Chapter one to answer 
the research questions. The next section presents the research objectives and how they 
have been addressed in this study: 
RO1: Explore the literature on InfoSec policies: 
 The presence of Ambiguities was established within the sampled InfoSec policy 
documents during the content analysis process.  
 The ambiguity presented itself in the form of unclear, vague and in some instances 
double negative policy statements. The following ambiguity categories were identified 
and listed, DN (double negative), CON (Contextual), ONP (Omission/ Null Pointer), 
SeLA (Structural/Semantic/ Lexical Ambiguity) and VID (vague implicit description). 
 
RO2: what is being addressed- Identify the main problems InfoSec policy compliance: 
 The main problems facing InfoSec policy compliance were presented in the 
systematic literature review section 4.2.2 as the lack of management support for 
InfoSec, organisational cultures of non-compliance, intentional and unintentional 
policy violation by employees (the insider threat), lack of policy awareness and 
training as well as the policy being unclear or ambiguous.   
 
RO3: Identify the main problems affecting InfoSec policy clarity; 
 The identified ambiguities posed a compliance problem as they could potentially alter 
the intended meaning of the policy statement to a slight variation, with unintended 
consequence. The policy users could misinterpret the ambiguous policy statement 
and act in a manner contrary to what the policy intended. 
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RO4: Define how InfoSec policy compliance and clarity can be improved. 
 A solution framework was compiled and suggested for each identified ambiguity 
problem category. 
 
The first and second research objectives, RO1 and RO2 were addressed in the form of a 
systematic literature review in section 4.2. The third research objective, RO3 was addressed 
by means of a content analysis in section 4.3. The fourth research objective was addressed 
by means of the proposed solutions and framework in Chapter 5. 
 
Qualitative research methods were used to address the research objectives and answer the 
research questions. A case study was used in the form of the higher education institution 
sample, to provide an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study. The case 
study was also used to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context 
(Yin, 2009). The next section presents the summary of findings from the study. 
6.3. Summary of findings 
This study investigated the existence of ambiguities within InfoSec policies in Higher 
Education and explored how the ambiguities pose a compliance problem. There were 
ambiguities detected in the InfoSec policies.  The findings in chapter four clearly indicate 
that ambiguity is present and evident within InfoSec policy documents. Such ambiguity could 
alter the user interpretation of the policy statement.  
 
The VID theme was the most prevalent type of ambiguity noted, and it is highly 
recommended that the policy writers should be aware of any assumptions that they hold 
about the users of their policies to avoid implicitly documenting the policy statements. 
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Rather, the policy writers could make a conscious effort to express the policy statements 
explicitly and in sufficient detail. 
 
This study investigated the existence of ambiguities within InfoSec policies and explored 
how the ambiguities pose a compliance problem. There were ambiguities detected in the 
reviewed InfoSec policies of higher education institutions. The VID theme was the most 
prevalent type of ambiguity at 70%, as noted in the reviewed purposive sample of InfoSec 
policies belonging to a higher education institution in South Africa. It is therefore highly 
recommended that policy writers be aware of any assumptions they hold about the users of 
their policies to avoid implicitly documenting the policy statements. Rather, policy writers 
should make a conscious effort to express the policy statements explicitly and in sufficient 
detail. 
 
In the secondary analysis, the ambiguity could ultimately be reduced into two categories, 
the language and structure theme. The language theme was more dominant at 88% of all 
observed ambiguity occurrences being accounted for in this theme. The least significant 
theme of structure only accounted for 12% of the overall ambiguity occurrences. Therefore, 
the policy writers should pay attention to their use of language in drafting the policy 
documents. 
 
The Language theme included: 
 Language: The use of unclear language by the policy writers; 
 Knowledge: assumed background knowledge of the policy user by the policy writers; 
the knowledge type could be: 
o Educational knowledge; 
o InfoSec awareness knowledge; 
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o Experience/experiential knowledge;  
 Personal experience in technology use; 
 Organisational culture and practices; 
 
6.4. Contributions 
The results of the study should inform practice in the field of InfoSec management such that 
the policy writers would use the presented frameworks when drafting or reviewing their 
InfoSec policies, to reduce the occurrence of ambiguities.  These proposed frameworks 
could be applied by anyone without any additional technical skills in information systems, 
albeit some knowledge about first-order formalisms would be needed for the underlying 
analysis.  
 
The target users would be mainly, the InfoSec managers in the process of developing, 
reviewing, updating and maintaining the InfoSec policy document. The managers could use 
this study as a reference point to begin the review of their policies for ambiguities, and to 
address any existing ambiguities towards clearer and more enforceable policy documents. 
Parts of the dissertation appeared as a conference paper (Buthelezi, Van Der Poll, & Ochola, 
2016). 
 
6.5. Future work 
Future research could investigate methods of resolving InfoSec policy ambiguity. User 
InfoSec research could borrow ambiguity resolution methods from the software development 
arena, which have been well researched (Abdelaziz, El-Tahir, & Osman, 2015). 
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The following strategies have been said to reduce ambiguity in requirements specification 
and could be tested for applicability to reduce ambiguity in InfoSec policies:  
 Formal methods  
 Ontologies 
 Automated disambiguation tools such as SREE  
 Manual analysis. 
In conclusion, clearer policy statements, which are explicitly documented, with simpler 
sentence structures could increase policy clarity. Where ambiguity already exists in InfoSec 
policy documents, the documents could be reviewed for implicit statements and revised to 
reduce ambiguity and increase the clarity of the document. The increased document clarity 
should facilitate user compliance with the said InfoSec policy. Clearer policy statements with 
simpler structure could increase compliance.   
 
6.6. Closing statement 
In conclusion, clearer policy statements, which are explicitly documented, with simpler 
sentence structures could increase policy clarity. Where ambiguity already exists in the 
InfoSec policy documents, the documents could be reviewed for implicit statements and be 
revised to reduce ambiguity and increase the clarity of the document. The increased 
document clarity should facilitate user compliance with the said InfoSec policy. Clearer 
policy statements with simpler structure could increase compliance. 
 
Unless InfoSec policies are designed in a way that ensures clarity, compliance may well 
remain a challenge. User awareness and training on the use of clear unambiguous language 
could be made available to policy writers in order to consciously improve the overall policy 
clarity. 
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